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AN INJURY TO THE CITIZEN, A PLEASURE TO THE STATE:  






It is a well-established principle of international law that an injury to the citizen is an 
injury to the state of his or her nationality.1  Ordinarily, if a non-citizen is injured by the acts of a 
host state, the state of his or her nationality would seek redress.2  By definition, a refugee 
maintains no such relationship.  The refugee not only has severed his relationship with the 
country of his nationality or habitual residence but also fears being persecuted by the 
government of that country.3  If that refugee is injured in a country where he sought refuge, then 
 
 Professor Won Kidane currently is a visiting assistant professor of law at Penn State Dickinson.  Before his current 
appointment, Professor Kidane practiced law with Piper Rudnick and later with Hunton & Williams.  Professor 
Kidane also has worked as a legal officer in association with the Regional Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees in Africa. 
1 Professor Henkin writes: “Long ago, we know, a government which offended a citizen of Rome offended Rome 
and if an American is abused elsewhere today, the United States is offended.”  LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 596 (3d ed., 1993).  Henkin suggests that  state responsibility for 
injury to aliens is not seen as creating rights for the alien as such, but he or she benefits because the law sees an 
offense to the individual as an offense against the State whose nationality the individual bears.  Thus the remedies 
for violation of these norms are accorded only to the State.   See id. at 677.  The International Court of Justice, in the 
seminal case Liechtenstein v. Guatemala, commonly known as the Nottebohm case, said: “[b]y taking up the case of 
its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in 
reality asserting its own rights – its right to ensure, in the person of its subject, respect for the rules of international 
law.” Liechtenstein v. Guatemala, 1955 WL 1(I.C.J), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 24 citing to P.I.C.J., Series A, No. 2, 12, and 
A/B, Nos 20-21, 17).  Elaborating on the individual’s relationship with a state of his nationality in the international 
context, the court further stated that nationality is “a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a 
genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and 
duties….[c]onferred by a State, it only entitles that State to exercise protection vis-à-vis another State, if it 
constitutes a transition into judicial terms of the individual’s connection with the State which has made him his 
national.” Id. at 23.  For a detailed discussion of this issue in the refugee context, see Section V(B), infra.  
2 In Nottebohm, the ICJ concluded that diplomatic protection of citizens and protection by means of international 
judicial proceedings constitute measures for the defense of the rights of the State, not the individual as such.  See 
Liechtenstein v. Guatemala, 1955 I.C.J. at 23. 
3 The most current definition of a refugee is contained in the 1951 Refugee Convention.  The Convention defines a 
refugee as a person: “owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, not having a nationality and being outside the 
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or owing to such fear unwilling to return 
to it.” Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: 189 UNTS 150, entry into force: 22 April 1954. at 1(A) (2) 
[hereinafter The Refugee Convention].  In this article, the term “refugee” is used to refer to a person who meets the 
above criteria regardless of whether or not that person has been recognized as a refugee by any state.  It is generally 
6 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 116 (2006). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
the country of origin that would have sought redress under normal diplomatic and consular 
situations certainly would be unwilling or even might be pleased to see the injury occur.  
A refugee could be injured in his country of refuge in many different ways.  One of the 
most serious and common injuries that a refugee could sustain occurs when the refugee is sent 
back to a place where he may face persecution.  Under normal circumstances, that is exactly 
what the country of origin wishes.  Generally, this could happen in two different ways: either 
with full intent and purpose or because of faulty administrative and/or judicial sanction.  The 
consequences of both are absolutely identical.  Upon return to his country of origin, the refugee 
may face severe treatment including death.  Countries with well-established systems of asylum 
adjudication rarely fall under the first category; however, they almost always cannot avoid 
falling under the second.  This article intends to demonstrate the inherent problems of refugee 
law that make it almost impossible to avoid some faulty administrative and judicial decisions and 
suggests remedial measures that would help alleviate some of the serious consequences.   
The problem of the law of refugee status starts with the definition of a refugee itself.  Part 
I of this article highlights the historical underpinnings of the legal definition of a refugee and 
puts the political compromise that went into crafting the criteria for refugee status into 
perspective.  Part II deals with the challenges associated with the interpretation of each element 
of the substantive definition of the Refugee Convention as well as problems of exclusion and 
cessation of refugee status under the Refugee Convention. Part III critically examines the 
challenges in defining and applying the burden and standard of proof in refugee status 
 
understood that recognition of one’s refugee status does not make him or her a refugee, but rather declares him or 
her a refugee.  As such, the fact of being a refugee necessarily comes before recognition.  Recognition is therefore 
declaratory, not constitutive.  See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), HANDBOOK ON 
PROCEDURE AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 
PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF  REFUGEES, HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 Reedited January 1992, UNHCR 1979 at 
Para. 28 [hereinafter HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES].  
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determination proceedings (asylum proceedings), which perhaps is the most serious of all 
challenges.  In Part IV, this article highlights the lack of concrete remedies for erroneous 
decisions and suggests alternative domestic and international remedies to limit the execution of 
erroneous decisions and mitigate the consequences of refoulment.4  This article concludes with a 
summary of observations and recommendations for moving forward.   
I. DEVELOPMENT OF REFUGEE LAW 
There have been population movements, large and small scale, throughout the recorded 
history of mankind.5  The emergence of movement of population as an international problem 
demanding reflection first was observable during World War I when millions of people were 
forced to flee their homes in Europe.6  The flight of people for safety again appeared in its worst 
 
4 The term “refoulment” is derived from the French term ‘refouler’ which stands for the act of returning or sending 
back.  See GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 117 (2d ed., 1996).  “Non-refoulment” is 
a fundamental principle of international law, which essentially means that no refugee may be returned to the 
territories of a country where he or she may face persecution.  The principle of non-refoulment is enshrined in 
several international instruments.  The two most important instruments are Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, 
supra note 3 (“No Contracting State shall expel or return “refouler” a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the 
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”), and Article  3 of  the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. res. 39/46, [annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 
51) at 197, U.N.Doc. A/39/51 (1984), entered into force June 26, 1987 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture] 
(“No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”). Presently, it is generally believed 
that the principle of non-refoulment has acquired the status of a norm of international law.  See, e.g., Statement by 
Dennis McNamara, Director, Division of International Protection, UNHCR, at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 
The 1951 Convention and International Protection, at 9, available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/admin/opendoc.htm?tbl=ADMIN&page=home&id=42b80f052 (last visited Nov. 13, 2005). The exact 
scope and application of this principle has been a subject of immense controversy over the years, particularly as it 
relates to interception of refugees prior to their arrival in the territories of contracting states.  For the current US 
perspective of this principle see generally Sale v. Haitian Counsel Center, 509 U.S. 155, 187 (1993) (concluding that 
the principle does not apply to refugees interdicted on the high seas).  For UNHCR perspective, see Executive 
Committee (EXCOM) Conclusion No. 22(1981), part II A, Para. 2 (“In all cases the fundamental principle of non-
refoulment, including non-rejection at the frontier must be scrupulously observed”); see also conclusion No. 82 
(1997), para. D, (iii) (affirming “[t]he need to admit refugees into the territories of states, which includes no rejection 
at the frontiers without fair and effective procedures for determining status and protection needs”).  The same 
statement is contained in the 1998 EXCOM conclusions.  Id.  (cited in UNHCR, Background Note on the Protection 
of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees Rescued at Sea, at 6. para. 18, available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/home?id=search–Global Consultations (last visited Nov. 10, 2005)). 
5 HARPO HAKOVIRAT, THE WORLD REFUGEE PROBLEM 21 (1991). 
6 Id. The number of people uprooted in Europe during WWI has been estimated at about 14 million.  
6 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 118 (2006). 
 
 
                                                            
form during World War II.7  This phenomenon first was contained by the efforts of governments 
and non-governmental organizations, and at that time it was believed that the problem was 
solved once and for all;8 a future intermittence was not contemplated.9  Regardless of what 
definition of “refugee” applied in any particular time in history, since World War II it is 
estimated that approximately 85 million persons have left their countries to seek refuge 
elsewhere.10
Once displacement became a real world problem, the community of nations took 
initiatives to govern the situation by law and create an international regime for the protection of 
refugees.  The law sought to strike a compromise between a state’s right to control whom it 
wishes to admit or exclude and the right of human persons to live with safety and dignity, free of 
fear and horror.11  For purposes of international law, states have chosen to employ limited 
criteria to distinguish refugees from among many categories of aliens.  The definition of a 
refugee varied from time to time and place to place. This Part briefly deals with the development 
of the law of refugee status. 
A. Refugee Law Before The Adoption of the 1951 Refugee Convention 
 
Approaching the problem of forced population movement in legal terms is a relatively 
recent phenomenon. Before the twentieth century, the international community had little or no 
 
7 Id. 
8 Id.  
9 There are no clear records showing any indication that the world community had thought of future refugee 
problems. See id. 
10 Id. at 22. For example, in the 1950s alone, the following events generated approximately 40 million refugees:  the 
Greek civil war, the Palestinian war, the partition of British India and the Korean War. According to UNHCR, over 
the years, it has assisted approximately 50 million refugees and other persons of concern.  UNHCR Facts, available 
at www.unhcr.org/facts (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).  Currently there are approximately 19.2 million refugees and 
other persons of concern to the UNHCR.  See id.    
11 W.GUNTHER PLAUT, ASYLUM - A MORAL DILEMMA 6 (1995). 
6 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 119 (2006). 
 
 
                                                            
concern for legal regulation of this phenomenon.12  However, the flight of more than one million 
Russians between 1917 and 1922 and the flight of hundreds of thousands of Armenians from 
Turkey during the early 1920s forced European governments to legally recognize the reality of 
international population movements.13
Between 1920 and 1950, a number of international instruments relating to the status of 
refugees were entered into, most under the auspices of the League of Nations.14  These 
instruments15 each adopted a group or category approach to the definition of “refugee.”16  Under 
these arrangements, the necessary conditions to acquire refugee status were: (1) that the person 
be outside of his country of nationality; and (2) he be without the protection of the country of his 
nationality.17  In a 1943 review of the earlier instruments at the Conference of Bermuda, 
participants introduced an extended mandate that included as refugees all persons, wherever they 
may be, who, as a result of events in Europe, have had to leave their country of nationality 
because of the danger to their lives or liberties on account of their race, religion or political 
 
12 There has never existed customary international law that authorized the admission of refugees.  See JAMES C. 
HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 1 (1992); see also LOUIS B. SOHN ET AL., THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS 
ACROSS BORDERS, Studies in Transnational Legal Policy. No.23, 106 (1992).  Although such customary law did not 
exist, provision of sanctuary for those in need has ancient origins.  Grahl-Madsen writes: “According to the Bible, 
Adam and Eve were driven out of Eden and became thereby the first refugees.  Mary and Joseph had to seek refuge 
in Egypt with the child Jesus Christ.”  ATEL GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
VOL I, 9 (1966).  The Old Testament also gives accounts of Cities of Refuge.  For example, Moses was commanded 
to create cities of refuge.  The main purpose of these cities of refuge was to provide sanctuary to “manslayers 
without intent.” See MUSALO, ET AL., REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY, 8 (2d ed., 2005). There also existed a Greco-
Roman secular concept of refuge. See id. at 9.  Early Roman Church Council declarations provided sanctuary to 
fugitive slaves.  Id. at 10. For a more detailed treatment of ancient origins of the concept of asylum, see generally id. 
at 1-24.  
13 See HATHAWAY, supra note 12, at 2.   
14 See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 4, at 4. 
15  The instruments include: The arrangements of May 26, 1926:84 LNTS No. 2004, and June 30, 1928: 89 LNTS 
No. 2006, the Convention of 28 October 1933:159 LNTS No. 3663 and Feb 10 1938: 192 LNTS No. 4461 and 
protocol of 14 Sept. 1939: 198 LNTS no. 4634, and the Constitution of International Refugee Organization (IRO) 20 
August 1948: 18 UNTS 3. 
16  GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 4, at 4. 
17  For example, the arrangement relating to the issue of identity certificates to Russian and Armenian Refugees of 12 
May 1926 defines Russian refugees as: “Any person of Russian origin who does not enjoy or who no longer enjoys 
the protection of the government of the USSR and who has not acquired another nationality.”  84 LNTS No. 2004.  
6 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 120 (2006). 
 
 
                                                            
opinion.18  
A relatively more precise definition, however, emerged after World War II.  This was 
first manifested in the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization (IRO).19   The IRO 
included as refugees all victims of the Nazi and Fascist persecution, certain category of persons 
of Jewish origin, and persons regarded as refugees before the outbreak of the Second World War 
for reasons of race, religion nationality or political opinion.20
Examination of the international refugee definition of the earlier instruments suggests 
that there were different approaches triggered by the necessity of the particular time in question. 
 Professor Hathaway categorizes each of these approaches into three perspectives:  judicial, 
social and individual.21  According to Hathaway, the definitions adopted between 1920 and 1935 
were in judicial terms because refugee status was designed to substitute a broken link between a 
person and the state of his nationality; the link that would have offered him protection under 
normal circumstances.22
The refugee instruments adopted between 1935 and 1939, on the other hand, incorporated 
a social approach: the group of persons categorized as refugees were desperate casualties of 
 
18 GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 4, at 4 (In 1943 the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) 
was established. One of its functions was to assist displaced persons in liberated countries and repatriation and return of 
prisoners of war). 
19 IRO was a specialized Agency of the UN.  It was established on the 20th of August, 1948, to deal with the 
problems of forced displacement resulted mainly due to the war. It was later substituted by UNHCR in 1950.  See 
GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 4, at 4. 
20 IRO Constitution.  Text 18 UNTS 3, 2001. The Constitution of the IRO for the first time provided that genuine 
refugees and displaced persons constitute an urgent problem that is international in scope and character, and that 
genuine refugees and displaced persons should be assisted by international action either to return to their countries of 
nationality or former habitual residence, or to find new homes else where. IRO Constitution, Preamble Paras. 2 and 
3. 
21 HATHAWAY, supra note 12, at 2-5. 
22 In 1929, the Advisory Commission for refugees clearly indicated that the characteristics and essential features of 
the problem were that persons classified as refugees had no regular nationality and were therefore deprived of the 
normal protection accorded to regular citizens of a state. See HATHAWAY, supra note 12, at 3 (citing the Report by 
Secretary General on the Future Organization of Refugee Work, League of Nations Doc. 1930 XIII. 2 (1930)). 
6 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 121 (2006). 
 
 
                                                            
socio-political eventualities.23  The primary objective of these instruments was to ensure the 
well-being and safety of the refugees so defined.24  Further, the arrangements made between 
1939 and 1950 adopted an individualist panorama.25 The purpose of refugee status from this 
perspective is to provide a means for individuals seeking personal freedom from manifest 
injustices.26  This perspective presupposes the distrust of authorities who made life intolerable in 
the refugee’s home country.27   
This individualistic approach continued after 1950 with the creation of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).  In 1949, even when the United Nations 
began to look for a broader approach, member states preferred a narrow definition,28 which was 
later revealed in the statute of the UNHCR and the 1951 Refugee Convention. The approach 
taken by these instruments is discussed below.  
B. Refugee Law After the Adoption of the 1951 Refugee Convention  
 
The creation in 1950 of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR)29  and the 1951 adoption of the Refugee Convention30 were landmark events in the 
history of the law of refugee status. The basic framework of the refugee law as it stands today 
 
23 HATHAWAY, supra note 12, at 4. 




28  Apart from those countries that actually had to deal with a large population of refugees, a consensus emerged that 
a broader category of persons were less of an international problem and did not require international protection.  
GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 4, at 6-7. 
29 The General assembly of the United Nations created the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) by Resolution No. 428(V) of December 1950. As it appears from the Statute of the High 
Commissioner's Office (an annex to the resolution) its function (mandate) is to provide international protection, 
under the auspices of the UN, to refugees who fall within the scope of the Statute and seek permanent solution for 
problems of refugees by assisting Governments.  Para. 1. Chapter 1, Statute. Text: UNGA Res. 217 A (III). 
30 Following the General Assembly’s Resolution of December 1950 and the convening of the Geneva conference of 
plenipotentiaries of various states, the Convention on the Status of Refugees was adopted. The conference was held 
from July 2-25, 1951.  According to the Preamble of the Convention, one of the important objectives of the 
convention is to revise and consolidate previous international agreements relating to the status of refugees and 
extend the scope. See The Refugee Convention, supra note 3.  
6 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 122 (2006). 
 
 
                                                            
took shape by the 1951 Refugee Convention.31
In addition to maintaining protection to persons already considered refugees under earlier 
instruments,32  the Refugee Convention extended international protection to any person who: 
as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of 
the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside 
the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable 
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.33  
 
As it appears from the definition, the Refugee Convention was designed to address 
refugee problems in Europe34 in the aftermath of the Second World War.35  This standard setting 
Convention not only provided for the criteria for adjudicating refugee status claims,36 but also 
specified persons to whom  protection shall not extend37 and situations whereby the Refugee 
Convention ceased to apply. 38    
 
31 DAVID A. MARTIN, THE NEW ASYLUM SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAW IN THE 1980S 1 (David A. Martin ed., 1988). 
32 See HATHAWAY, supra note 12. 
33 The Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at Art. 1 (A)(2) 
34 For the purpose of this convention, the world events occurring before  January 1, 1951   
   A.  Shall be understood to mean either: 
a. Events occurring in Europe before January 1, 1951; or  
 
b. Events occurring in Europe or else where before January 1, 1951, and each contracting state 
shall make a declaration at the time of signature, ratification or accession, specifying which of 
these meanings it applies for the purpose of its obligations under this convention. 
The Refugee Convention, supra note 3, Art. 1(B)(1)(a)and (b). 
35  In addition to their desire for the refugee definition to serve strategic political objectives, the majority of the states 
that adopted The Refugee Convention sought to create a rights regime conducive for the redistribution of the post 
world war refugee burden from European shoulders. HATHAWAY, supra note 12, at 8. (citing Doc. E/AC. 7SR. 166, 
at 18. August 22, 1950) (footnotes omitted). 
36 These criteria specified in more simple terms are: A person should be: a) Outside of his country of nationality or 
habitual residence; b) Unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; c) Such inability or 
unwillingness should be due to a well-founded fear of persecution; d) The fear must be based on one of the five 
grounds (race, religion, nationality, social group, political opinion). 
37These are persons who are believed either to have protection from other agencies such as the United Nations Relief 
and Work Agency, including those who have acquired the nationality of the asylum country, or those who are 
believed to be undeserving of international protection for crimes that they are believed to have committed in their 
countries of origin.  See The Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at Art. 1. For a detailed discussion of this topic see 
Sec. III. B. infra.   
38This situation could be due to the refugees own voluntary act or due to a change of circumstances.  See The 
6 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 123 (2006). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
After the adoption of the Refugee Convention, however, refugee situations began to 
appear in various parts of the world due to causes that could not be linked to pre-1951 events.39   
This necessitated the revision of the Convention to give it a universal application and adjust it to 
new refugee situations.40  The 1967 United Nations Refugee Protocol removed the temporal and 
geographic limitation of the 1951 Refugee Convention.41  Presently about 141 states in all parts 
of the world are parties to the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol.42
In the 1960s and 1970s, the focus of attention shifted to the African continent.  
Precipitating this shift was the number of people increasingly displaced as a result of the 
emergence of newly-independent nations within the former colonial boundaries that had cut 
across language and ethnic cleaves.43  In Asia, similarly, large scale displacements also followed 
decolonization.44
As the large number of people displaced because of war or civil strife continued to grow 
in different parts of the world, the applicability of the somewhat narrow and individualistic 
criteria of the Statute of the UNHCR45 and the Refugee Convention became subjects of great 
controversy.46  However, the necessity  to revisit the existing legal framework has been 
 
Refugee Convention, at  Art. 1 (D), (E), (F). For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Section IV. infra. 
39  PAUL WEIS, THE REFUGEE CONVENTION OF 1951, COMMENTARY (1995) at IX.  One of the major exoduses that 
occurred immediately after World War II was the displacement from Hungary in 1956. Id. 
40 Id. at 2.  
41 The UN Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, entered into force Oct. 4, 1967. 
[hereinafter The Refugee Protocol].  The Refugee Protocol is an independent legal instrument that incorporates the 
1951 refugee convention by reference. States may be parties to either or both instruments.  The United States, for 
instance, is a party only to the Protocol.  
42  UNHCR Global Report, 2002, available at www.unhcr.org/cgi-lin/texis/vtx/publ/opendoc.pdf> (last visited Oct. 
25, 2005.) 
43 DAVID A. MARTIN, supra note 31, at 2. 
44 For example, in 1971, the civil war in Pakistan resulted in the displacement of approximately 10 million people. 
See id. at 2-3. 
45 The Statute of the UNHCR defines a refugee in the same way as the 1951 Refugee Convention does, except that it 
does not contain membership to a social group as one of the grounds of persecution. See Chapter II A (ii) of the 
Statute, an annex to GA Resolution 319 A (IV) of Dec. 1949. 
46 The controversy relates to whether or not the applicability of the definition tends to require a particularized inquiry 
to decide whether the person or group of persons to which he belongs is subject to a focused threat of persecution. 
6 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 124 (2006). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
somewhat diverted by, among other considerations, the General Assembly's  consecutive 
authorization of the UNHCR to assist  refugees that fall within the competence of the Statute as 
well as those who may not strictly fall under the Statute’s mandate but who nevertheless are 
regarded as  refugees.47
At the regional level, however, an attempt was made to reformulate the legal framework 
to include within the definition of a refugee those forced to leave their countries owing to causes 
other than the grounds stated in the Refugee Convention.  The prime demonstration of such 
modification is found in the Organization of African Unity’s definition of a refugee.48  The OAU 
Convention Relating to the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa extends protection, 
not only to refugees so considered in the sense of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 
Protocol, but also to any person outside of his country “owing to external aggression, 
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order.”49  Similarly, the 
Organization of American States (OAS) recommended, in the Declaration of Cartagena,50 a 
definition that includes persons who have fled their country of nationality because their lives, 
safety, or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal 
conflict, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously 
disturbed public order.51  Although the approach taken by these regional organizations has not 
been adopted in a universal legal instrument, various recommendations, resolutions, and 
 
See MARTIN, supra note 31, at 3. 
47 See, e.g., UN GA Resolution NO. 3455, 9 Dec.1975 (humanitarian assistance to Indo-Chinese displaced persons). 
48 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 
1001 UNTS 45 entered into force Sept. 10, 1969 [hereinafter The OAU Convention]. 
49 Id. at Art. I. 
50 The Declaration, which usually is called the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, was adopted in 1984 by members 
of the Organization of American States (OAS). Text OAS/ Ser.L/V/II.66, Doc. 10, Nov. 1, pp.190-93. 
51  Id. Chapter III.  Para. 3. 
6 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 125 (2006). 
 
 
                                                            
declarations52  demonstrate the concern and importance of protecting such category of persons.  
  Accordingly, today there seems to have emerged two classes of refugees: refugees who 
have fled individualized persecution based on Refugee Convention grounds and refugees who 
were forced to leave their homes due to generalized violence or a serious disturbance of public 
order.  Those in the former category commonly are called Convention or Human Rights 
Refugees, and those in the latter sometimes are called Humanitarian or Humanitarian Law 
Refugees.53  
Based on the recent practice of states and international organizations, therefore, the term 
‘refugee’ in current usage not only includes those individuals who qualified for refugee status 
due to a well-founded fear of persecution based on Convention grounds, but also includes large 
groups of persons who crossed an international frontier for reasons traceable to armed conflicts 
and economic and socio-political changes that made life at home intolerable.54  It should be 
noted, however, that the legal consequences and the benefits attached thereto depend on the 
particular type of legal status accorded to each particular category of refugees.55    
As evident from the above discussion, states party to the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and/or The 1967 Protocol excluded all persons except those who met the carefully crafted 
refugee definition from the regime of international protection.  The definition, on its face, 
excludes the vast majority of the 20 million refugees in the world today.  Only a small fraction of 
these refugees could qualify for Convention Refugees status.  The identification of refugees who 
 
52 These include United Nations General Assembly Resolutions that authorized the UNHCR to assist such a category 
of persons.  See, e.g., UNGA res.1784(XVII), Dec. 7, 1962 (requesting the UNHCR to assist Chinese refugees in a 
mass displacement situation). 
53 See Kay Hailbronner, Non-refoulement and "Humanitarian" Refugees: Customary International Law or Wishful 
Legal Thinking, in MARTIN, supra note 31, at 125; see also GOARN MELANDER ET AL., THE TWO REFUGEE 
DEFINITIONS 1-4 (1987). 
54 See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 4, at 29-30. 
55 See id. at 30. 
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qualify for Convention status has been an extremely difficult task around the world.  Problems of 
interpretation and application of various legal terminologies employed by the Refugee 
Convention significantly contributed to this challenge.  The following section analyzes the 
challenges associated with the identification of the category of persons to whom the Convention 
purports to offer protection and demonstrates the inevitability of erroneous decisions that may 
lead to dramatic consequences.   
III. ANALYSIS OF THE REFUGEE DEFINITION UNDER THE 1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION 
 
The provisions of the Convention consist of inclusion clauses that define the criteria that 
a claimant for refugee status must satisfy to be recognized as a refugee and exclusion and 
cessation clauses that stipulate conditions of denial and loss of refugee status, respectively.56  
Each one of these clauses employs technical legal terminologies, and set their own criteria.  A 
discussion of the difficulties relating to the application of each one of the important 
terminologies follows.   
A. Requirements of Refugee Status 
 According to Article 1 A(2) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of  Refugees, the 
term "refugee"  applies to any person who: 
. . . owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside of the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a 
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a 
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it57
 
Under this definition, at least four requirements must be met: (1) The asylum seeker must 
be outside of his country of nationality or habitual residence; (2) he must have to have a well-
 
56 For the discussion of exclusion and cessation clauses see Sections B and C, infra. 
57 The Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at Art. 1(A)(2). 
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founded fear; (3) the fear must be of persecution, and (3) the feared persecution must arise from 
one of the stated grounds.  Adjudicators around the world have had great difficulty determining 
the exact scope and application of these terms.  This section highlights the difficulties associated 
with the application of the concepts represented by these terms and shows how faulty decisions 
are practically unavoidable.  
 1. Outside of the Country of Nationality or Habitual Residence  
Owing to several considerations such as state sovereignty and the principle of non-
intervention,58 the Refugee Convention makes it a requirement that a person must first set foot 
on foreign soil in order to be eligible for international protection.59  International protection in 
this sense includes granting of asylum,60 which entitles the refugee to a number of rights 
including the right not to be returned61 to the country where his life or liberty might be 
threatened.62
Although the whole notion of the institution of asylum is protect persons fleeing 
 
58 For example, The International Court of Justice, in the Colombian-Peruvian case, said that a decision to grant 
diplomatic asylum involves a derogation from the sovereignty of that state.  It withdraws the offender from the 
jurisdiction of the territorial state and constitutes an intervention in matters that are exclusively within the 
competence of that state. Such a derogation from territorial sovereignty cannot be recognized unless a legal basis is 
established in each particular case. C. NEALE RONNING, DIPLOMATIC ASYLUM 5 (1965) (citing the Colombian-
Peruvian Asylum case, Judgment of November 20th, 1950: I.C.J. Reports 1950. at 266). “Whether or not national 
governments will yield their external sovereignty in our life time to make international governments possible…one 
basic fact emerges from our study.  It is the individual, not the sovereign state, that is the end purpose of the new 
legal order that has been erected in our generation under the title of human rights.” HATHAWAY, supra note 12, at 32 
n.18, (quoting J. JOYLE, THE NEW POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, . 225 (1978)).  Hathaway says, “As the authority 
of the international community over human rights has increased with the passage of time, so too has the reach of 
refugee law expanded, at least tentatively, to protect some internal refugees.”  Id.  When Professor Hathaway says 
“internal refugees,” he is referring to internally displaced persons (IDPs).  The reference to tentative expansion is 
exemplified by the UNHCR’s involvement to support the IDPs on some accessions by the authorization of the 
General Assembly of the UN.     
59 The Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at Art. 1(A)(2). 
60 The word asylum may have a double meaning.  It may mean a place or territory where one is not subject to seizure 
by one’s pursuers, or it may mean protection or freedom from such seizure. In international law the term is used in 
the latter sense. ATEL GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOL. II, 3  (1972).  
61 See supra note 4 for a brief discussion of the principle of non-refoulement. 
62 See, for example, The Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at Arts. 12-24, for other rights of a refugee. 
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persecution,63 the freedom that the Convention purports to grant is limited to some geographic 
locations, i.e., the person first must be lucky enough to escape the persecution aimed at him.64  
The existence of this criterion excludes two categories of persons who otherwise meet every 
criteria for refugee status except for their presence in certain geographic locations: those who 
have moved from place to place within the boundaries of a state and are unable to get themselves 
out of that state65 and those who have taken temporary refuge in places that traditionally are 
regarded as inviolable sanctuaries, such as religious and diplomatic premises.66
The operative assumption is that international refugee law cannot be applied to rescued 
individuals or groups of persons in fear of persecution unless they avail themselves of the 
protection of another country, which in most cases is dependent on fortuitous circumstances. The 
decision to exclude these categories of persons has valid theoretical and practical foundations.  
Through this requirement, however, the Refugee Convention begins narrowing down the 
category of persons that would benefit from its provisions, not because these persons are 
undeserving of protection, but because of theoretical and practical reasons.  The following 
sections critically analyze the difficulties associated with the identification of persons whom the 





63 See Section III (A)(3) infra, for a discussion of the meaning of the term persecution.  
64 “It follows from the principle of territorial supremacy and integrity of state that, once a person sets foot on foreign 
soil, he has implicitly found asylum, in the sense that he is no longer subject to (lawful) seizure by the authorities of 
the country from which he has fled.” GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 60, at 4.   
65 Persecution by local governments tolerated by the central government or persecution by non-government agents in 
a particular area may force the person to flee internally.  For a brief discussion of agents of persecution, see Section 
2, infra. 
66 See GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 60, at 6 (discussion of temporary refuge in the traditional sense); see also PLAUT, 
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2. Well-Founded Fear 
 According to the Convention’s definition, the alien’s67 inability or unwillingness to 
return should be based on a well-founded fear of being persecuted.68  The term well-founded is a 
manifestation of the state’s desire to maintain the objective assessment of both the genuineness 
and justifiableness of the claimant’s subjective perception of the situation in his country of 
origin.69  According to this definition, what the claimant feels about his situation is only the first 
step.70  Anyone who claims refugee status may have his own “fear,” whether it is well-founded 
or not; however, legal recognition depends on the views of the authorities of a receiving state.  
The main question remains whether or not an objective assessment of a subjective fear is 
practicable in refugee situations.  Although the Convention provides this criterion, it does not 
outline a clear standard of adjudication.71  As a result, it has remained a subject of inconsistent 
interpretation and application.  Some adjudicators require that the claimant shows past 
persecution to prove that he may become a victim of future persecution if he returns to the same 
 
supra note 11, at 17. 
67 Although, in this article, there is some reluctance to use the term “alien” to signify a human person from another 
nation, widespread use in statutes and academic literature makes it almost impossible to completely avoid its use.  
The connotations are obvious.  See Kevin R. Johnson, “Aliens” and US Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal 
Construction of Non-Persons, 28 U. MIAMI  INTER-AM L. REV. 263 (1996-97) (arguments regarding the negative 
connotations of this term); see also Michele R. Pistone & Philip G. Schrag, The New Asylum Rule: Improved But 
Still Unfair, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, n. 64 (2001) (Professor Pistone says that she remembers being terribly offended 
when referred to as an alien by Japanese authorities in connection with her visa application to work in Japan.  The 
only meaning that she has attributed to the term alien as a college student was “creatures from other planets.”).   
68 See The Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at Art. I (A)(2).    
69 See HATHAWAY, supra note 12, at 68. Different refugee status adjudicators have, on many occasions, given 
varying interpretations.  This of course is a direct reflection of the drafting and negotiating process of the 
Convention. This suggests that the majority of contracting states favored a vague standard that could be interpreted 
according to the wishes of the parties independently. For example, the United States Representative proposed, in the 
drafting process, that the standard should simply be “because of fear of persecution” or “because of persecution.”  
U.N. Doc. E/ AC. 32/ L.4, UN Doc. E/ AC. 34/ January 18, 1950.  The delegation of France supported a standard of 
“justifiable fear,” and the British delegation supported “[s]erious apprehension based on reasonable grounds of 
persecution.”  U.N. Doc. E/ AC 32/ L3, January 17, 1950; see also HATHAWAY, supra note 12, at 66-69; James C. 
Hathaway, the Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law, 1920-1950, 33 I.C.L.Q. 348, 374-379 (1984) 
(discussing a history of the term).    
70 See GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 12, at 174.  
71 See HATHAWAY, supra note 12, at 75.    
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place.72  Others contend that past persecution can only help as a presumption of future 
persecution and thus the possibility of future persecution still must be proven.73  
Atel Grahl-Madsen writes that whether or not a person will become a subject of 
persecution if he is returned to his country of origin should be assessed on the merits of each 
individual case.74  A number of considerations need to be taken into account including the 
political situation of the individual, his active opposition, background, and the general situations 
prevalent in his country.75  The use of this test as a tool for determining refugee status is not 
uncommon among different adjudicators.76  For example, the Immigration Appeals Board of 
Canada, in the Rouzbeh Amjadishad77 case, pointed out that subjective fear is capable of 
objective assessment as long as the person claiming refugee status demonstrates his case 
consistently, plausibly, and credibly, including specific events or persons intervened in his life to 
create an irrepressible feeling of a physical or a psychological threat against him. 78   
   According to this approach, the claimant’s own testimony may be adequate as long as it is 
consistent, plausible, and credible.  In 1990, The Justice Department of the United States issued a 
regulation, elaborating the "well-foundedness" test of the 1980 Refugee Act: 79  
In evaluating whether the applicant has sustained the burden of proving that he or 
she has a well-founded fear of persecution, the asylum officer or immigration 
judge shall not require the applicant to provide evidence that there is a reasonable 
possibility he or she would be singled out individually for persecution if:  
 (A) The applicant establishes that there is a pattern or practice in his or her 
country of nationality or, if stateless, in his or her country of last habitual 
 
72 See GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 12, at 176 (citing the decision of the German adjudicators in the 1950s). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 181. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 181-188 (citing cases). 
77  HATHAWAY, supra note 12, at 72 (citing Immigration Appeals Board Decision M85-1935, May 13, 1987). 
78 Id. at 72 (citing 4 per M. Dore Accord Kaul Garcia Zavala, Immigration Appeals decision 81-1222, C.L.I.C. notes 
45, 10, June 29, 1982). 
79 Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1080) [hereinafter Refugee Act] (codified at Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 
U.S.C. 1101, et. seq., (1994)) [hereinafter INA]. 
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residence, of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant 
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, 
or political opinion; and  
(B) The applicant establishes his or her own inclusion in, and identification with, 
such group of persons such that his or her fear of persecution upon return is 
reasonable.80    
   
Under this standard, sufficient proof of a well-founded fear consists of evidence that: (1) there 
exists a certain identifiable and targeted group; (2) that certain categories of persons are its 
members; and (3) the applicant is one of such members.  The United States Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) and the different courts of appeal also have given differing 
interpretations.81  In INS v. Stevic,82 the U.S. Supreme Court required “evidence establishing that 
it is more likely than not that the alien would be subject to persecution."83                   
The Court of Appeals of Great Britain, in Koyaziakaja v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, 84 decided by majority vote that the standard of proof that corresponds to the 
Convention’s "well-founded" fear test evidence of "a reasonable degree of likelihood" of 
persecution.85  According to the majority opinion, this standard of proof, which follows from 
                                                             
80 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i). 
81 For example, in Fleverrinor v. INS, the immigration judge interpreted the "well-founded" fear test to mean  
“likelihood" of persecution. In the same case, the court of appeals employed a "probable persecution" test. 
Fleverrinor v. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 585 F.2d 129, 132-34 (5th Cir. 1978). In Mritineaus v. 
INS, a "clear probability" of persecution test was used.  Mritineaus v. INS, 556 F. 2d 306, 307 (5th Cir. 1977).  In 
Daniel v. INS, the Court used a “probability of persecution” test.  Daniel v. INS, 528 F.2d 1278, 1279 (5th Cir. 
1976).  In Remaclud, the BIA used a “reasonable fear” test.  Remaclud, 14 I. N. December 429, 434 Board of 
Immigration Appeal (BIA 1973). 
82 INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S 407 (1984).  
83 467 U.S. at 430.  The respondent’s argument in this case was that “A fear of persecution is 'well-founded ' if the 
evidence establishes some basis in reality for the fear. This would appear to mean that so long as the fear is not 
imaginary i.e., if it is founded in reality at all . . . it is well-founded.  A more moderate position is that so long as an 
objective situation is established by evidence, it need not be shown that the situation will probably result in 
persecution, but it is enough that persecution is a reasonable probability.”  Id. at 425.  In this case, the Court 
distinguished the “well-founded fear” standard used in applications for asylum and instead employed a “more likely 
than not” standard, traditionally used in applications for withholding of deportation (under 243(h) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1980), which requires a  “clear probability of persecution.” See id.  
84 RE MADDISON MA, GREAT BRITAIN IMMIGRATION APPEALS (LONDON: HMSO [1995-1st Quarter] IMMAR1-156 
at 1-5. 
85 Id. at 9. 
6 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 132 (2006). 
 
 
Secretary of State v. Sivakumar,86 assesses both past occurrences of persecution and the 
likelihood of future persecution.87  The minority opinion, however, suggested that the truth or 
falsity of the alleged past persecution should be assessed with the normal civil standard of the 
balance of probability, but that the future threat of persecution should be assessed on the basis of 
a "likelihood of persecution” standard.88  In this case, one of the judges, Lord Diplock, 
concerning the problem of the usage of such terminologies, said:  
I wouldn't quarrel with the way in which the test was stated by the magistrate or 
with the alternative way in which it was expressed by the Divisional Court " a 
reasonable chance", "substantial grounds for thinking", "a serious possibility", I 
see no significant  difference between these various ways of describing the degree 
of likelihood of the persecution.89
 
In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,90 the U.S. Supreme Court revisited the "more likely than not” 
standard set by INS v. Stevic91and held that "so long as an objective situation is established by the 
evidence, it need not show that the situation will probably result in persecution, but it is enough that 
persecution is a reasonable possibility."92  In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court took note 
of the analysis provided by the UNHCR Handbook on Procedure and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee status.93  The handbook notes that generally, the applicant's fear ought to be considered 
well-founded if he or she can establish, to a reasonable degree, that his or her continued stay in the 
country of origin has become intolerable to him because of the reasons stated in the definition and  
the same state of affairs still prevail. 94  Atel Grahl-Madsen, as cited by the Supreme Court, 
                                                             
86 See id.  
87 Id. at 1.  
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 2. 
90 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S 421 (1987). 
91 INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S 407 (1984) 
92 See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S at 440. 
93 HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES, supra note 3.  The court noted that the explanation in the UNHCR handbook has no 
force of law that could bind the INS with reference to the asylum procedures of Sec. 208(a) of the INA.  Id. at 439.   
94 Id. 
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indicated what he considers to be a typical case of well-founded fear.  He provides the following 
example:  
Let us . . . presume that it is known that in the applicant's country of origin every 
tenth adult male person is either put to death or sent to some remote labor camp . . . 
in such a case it would be only too apparent that anyone who has managed to escape 
from the country in question will have ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ upon 
his eventual return.95  
 
 In line with this, the Court concluded that “[t]here is simply no room in the United Nations’ 
definition for concluding that because an applicant only has a 10% chance of being shot, tortured, or 
otherwise persecuted, that he or she has no ’well-founded fear’ of the event happening."96  
This is perhaps the clearest articulation of the well-founded fear test of the Refugee 
Convention.  However, it has not made the process of refugee status determination significantly 
easier.  Adjudicators must determine, based on extremely limited evidence (often the claimant’s 
testimony alone), that the refugee would have a 10 percent chance of being shot or tortured or 
persecuted in any other manner.  In reality, it is extremely difficult to find a simple pattern like 
the “every tenth male adult” model, because the behavior of persecutors in most parts of the 
world often is varied, irregular and unpredictable.  The difficulty associated with the burden and 
standard of proof is discussed in section IV below.   
 
95 Id. at 431 (citing GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 12). 
96 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S 421, 439 (1987); see also  INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).  In those 
cases the Supreme Court ruled that Article 33.1 (non-refoulment) of the Convention does not extend to everyone 
who meets the definition of a refugee.  The benefit of this provision would only attach when two requirements are 
met: the refugee shows that he or she has a well-founded fear of being persecuted, and that his or her life “would be 
threatened” if deported.  See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S at 440-41.  Withholding of deportation thus is subject to a 
much stricter scrutiny in the United States.  The U.S. currently is the only jurisdiction that does not consider all 
refugees to be eligible for non-refoulment.  See MUSALO ET AL., supra note 12, at 80.  Similar language is used in the 
non-refoulment provision of the Convention Against Torture.  “No State shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a 
person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture.” See Convention Against Torture, supra note 4, at Art. 3(1).  This Convention was implemented 
in the US by the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (Pub L. 105-277, 112 Stt. 268-821).  
Regarding the burden and standard of proof,  Sec. 208.18 (a)(2) states: “The burden of proof is on the applicant for 
withholding of removal under this paragraph to establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be 
tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 
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3. Persecution   
 
 According to the Refugee Convention, the well-founded fear must be of “persecution.”97 
Because the Convention does not explain what acts or omissions constitute persecution, the 
definition of persecution has remained a subject of great contention.  For example, should a 
person seeking asylum because he fears being imprisoned for one month for political reasons be 
recognized as a refugee?  Or should a person who has been denied a scholarship due to his race 
be granted refugee status elsewhere?  Or a young person who flees to escape national military 
service?  Different adjudicators and commentators have given differing interpretations of what 
might constitute persecution.  
The two common interpretations of the term “persecution” can be categorized as liberal 
and restrictive. The restrictive interpretation suggests that persecution means only "deprivation 
of life and physical freedom."98  A physical attack must be sufficient to cause the victim’s death 
or loss of physical freedom in order to constitute persecution.99  Paul Weis, on the other hand, 
puts forward a liberal interpretation of persecution and suggests that the term persecution should 
be interpreted in light of the developing human rights concepts.100  At the very least, he suggests, 
there should be a nexus between persecution and the failure on the part of the states to observe 
basic human rights.  He cites the Preamble to the Convention, which contains the principle that 
refugees shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms, to give credence to the view that violation 
 
97 The term persecution appeared for the first time in the draft of the Constitution of the International Refugee 
Organization (IRO), later included in the statute of the UNHCR in 1950 and the Refugee Convention.  Eduardo 
Arboceda et al., The Convention Refugee Definition in the West: Disharmony of Interpretation and Application, 5 
INT'L J. OF REFUGEE L. No.1, 78 (1993). 
98 GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 12, at 193 (quoting ZINK). Elaborating on this interpretation, Zink suggests that one 
can invoke the threat to life if he is forced to live unemployed without any means of livelihood.  See id.  
99 Id. 
100 See WEIS, supra note 39, at XVII. Clearly the concept of persecution cannot have remained unaffected by 
subsequent developments in the law relating to human rights.  Any meaning given to the concept of persecution must 
take into account the existing general human rights standards.  Id. 
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of certain human rights “may either constitute persecution per se, or are evidence thereof.”101
  According to Weis, the following acts may constitute persecution: serious disadvantages 
including jeopardy to life, physical integrity or liberty, discrimination, detention, confinement 
and banishment, and general denial of certain human rights.102  Nevertheless, Paul Weis does not 
suggest how severe these acts or denials must be.  On this point, Grahl-Madsen argues that there 
should be a standard for the existence of at least a minimum degree of severity and concludes 
that imprisonment for a three month period or more might constitute persecution, but deprivation 
of liberty for ten days does not.103
Judicial interpretations also have been varied.  For example, in Klawitter v. INS,104 the 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided that unwanted sexual advances may not constitute 
persecution if the behavior is a reflection of the perpetrators’ interest in the victim rather than an 
attempt to persecute her based on protected grounds.105  On the other hand, in Lazo-Majano v. 
INS,106  the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted asylum to a Salvadorian woman who 
had been sexually abused by an army officer.107  In this case, the court recognized sexual assault 
as a measure of persecution for political opinion, because the petitioner had asserted her political 
belief that men should not have dominion over women.108  The response by some European 
adjudicators to the rape victims of Bosnian Serb forces was completely different. Sexual assault 
 
101 Id.   
102 Id. at XVIII. 
103 GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 12, at 201 (citing to German Cases, for example, Case 182 VIII55 May 28, 1957). 
The Court concluded in this case (2156 II/55 April 1957) that detention for three months and interrogation for more 
than fifteen times for political reasons constitutes persecution.  See id. at 198.    
104 Klawitter v. INS, 970 F.2d 149 (6th Cir. 1992) 
105 Id. at 151, 154.  The applicant was a Polish woman who alleged that she was sexually abused by the authorities of 
the Polish government because she refused to join the Communist Party. This decision disregards sexual abuse as a 
persecutory action, and the immigration judge and the BIA did not consider the assault as a result of political 
motives.  See id.  
106 Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987). 
107 Her belief that men should not have dominion over women was regarded as a political opinion. See id.  
108 See Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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consistently has been rejected as a persecutory measure.109  For example, Austrian adjudicators 
characterized rape as just one general dreadful predicament, not persecution in the sense of the 
Refugee Convention.110
Concerning gender related persecution, the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board 
(IBR) adopted a radically different approach.111  In the landmark case of Kedra Hassen Farah,112 
a Somali citizen alleged that her ten-year old daughter would face ritual female genital 
mutilation should she return to Somalia.113 The Immigration and Refugee Board granted Farah, 
her ten-year old daughter, and her seven-year old son refugee status based on three different 
types of persecution, which the IBR identified in the course of the proceeding.114
The mother, Kedra Hassen Farah, was granted refugee status because, if she returned to 
Somalia, the Somali National Court would have applied Islamic Law115 and would have granted 
custody of her children to her ex-husband.  That act would have violated Farah's rights as a 
parent, which are recognized by Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR).116  For example, she should have equal rights during marriage and in case of its 
dissolution.117  Accordingly, Farah may have suffered psychological trauma because she would 
 
109 See Joan Fitzpatrick, Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 229, 241 (1996). 
110 Id. The other ground for the denial of the Bosnian rape victims was the reluctance of the adjudicators to consider 
them as belonging to a certain social group.  See id.   
111 Canada has adopted the 1951 Refugee Convention, and the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) is an 
administrative body empowered to adjudicate refugee status claims.  For a detailed discussion of gender related 
persecution, see Kris Ann Balser Moussette, Female Genital  Mutilation and Refugees in the United States--A Step 
in the Right Direction, 19 B.C. INTL & COMP. L. REV. 353 (1996).  
112 Moussette, supra note 111, at n.1 (citing Kedra Hassen Farah, Convention Refugee Determination Decisions No. 
T93-12198, T93-12199, T93-12197 at 7, 10 (May 10, 1994). 
113 The IRB applied guidelines issued by the chairperson in accordance with section 65(3) of the Canadian 
Immigration Act (Ottawa Canada March 9, 1993).  See id. 
114 Id. 
115 See id. at 378.  
116 Id. 
117 Id. Article 16 of the UDHR provides that:  “Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race , 
nationality or religion have the right to found a family, they are entitled to equal rights in marriage, during marriage 
and at its dissolution.”  UNGA Res. 217 A(III) December 10, 1948. 
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have been unable to protect her daughter from genital mutilation.118
Her ten-year old daughter also was granted refugee status,119 on the grounds that (1) 
undergoing genital mutilation would violate her right to personal security as a human person, 
provided for under Article 3 of the UDHR;120 and (2) genital mutilation violates the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,121 and in particular Article 24, which protects 
children from traditional practices prejudicial to children’s health.122  Finally, her seven-year old 
son also was granted status on the basis that if he returned to Somalia he may be "removed from 
the care and nurture of his mother."123
In short, in this case, the following three acts were considered persecutory: (1) undue 
denial of child custody because of the trauma that may follow and the feeling of inability to 
protect one’s child undergoing harmful physical pain, particularly genital mutilation;124 (2) 
female genital mutilation;125and (3) denial of a child’s right to the care and nurture of a 
mother.126
United States Immigration Judge, Kendall Warren,127 also has adopted a similar approach 
in Lydia Omowvnmi Oluloro's application for suspension of deportation128 in March 1994.  Even 
 
118 Moussette, supra note 111, at 378-79.  
119 See id. at 379. 
120 Id. at 380 (Article 3 of the UDHR states “Everyone has the right to life liberty and security of the person.  
Adopted and Proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) of December 10, 1948.  See also Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, entered into force, September 9, 1990. (Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child states “Parties shall take all effective and appropriate measurers with a view to abolishing traditional practices 
prejudicial to the health of children.”)  
121 See Moussette, supra note 111, at 380. 
122 See id. 
123 Id. In this case the three of them were categorized as belonging to different social groups.  
124 See id at 378. 
125 See id. at 379. 
126 Id. 
127 Deportation proceedings, Portland Oregon, No A72 147 491 at 20 ( March 23, 1994) Oral decision. See id. at 
389.    
128 Moussette, supra note 111, at 389.  The Judge in fact believed that there was a strong likelihood that Oluoro’s 
daughters would be subjected to FGM if returned to Nigeria. Her two children were United States citizens and her 
husband also was a permanent resident with whom she did not have a good relation.  She is a 32-year-old native 
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if the judge did not specifically mention and rule on each type of persecutory measure cited in 
the Farah case,129 he characterized female genital mutilation as a "cruel, painful and dangerous" 
act130 and granted an order of suspension of deportation of the claimant Ms. Oluloro,131 a 
Nigerian citizen who claimed refugee status mainly for fear of her daughter's being subjected to 
mutilation should she return to Nigeria.132   
According to the 1995 guidelines issued by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, a 
woman who has a well-founded fear of genital mutilation may successfully claim political 
asylum in the United States.133  The U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) also determined 
that FGM is a severe treatment that must be considered as a measure of persecution.134  No 
circuit court ever has disagreed with this conclusion.135  The Courts of Appeal for the Seventh 
and Ninth Circuits have, in fact, given their express approval.136     
In Abay v. Ashcroft137, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently granted 
asylum to a mother who proved a well-founded fear of her daughter’s genital mutilation.138  The 
court’s reasoning was similar to Canada’s Farah case.  It said that the governing principle of 
interpretation in favor of refugee protection demands that the mother be granted asylum.139  This 
 
Nigerian.  See id.  
129 See id. at nn.84-86. 
130 See id. at 390. 
131 Id. 
132 Id.  US Circuit courts have not yet allowed the granting of asylum to parents of children granted asylum based on 
FGM.  Some immigration courts have however allowed parents derivative status.  This is becoming a subject of 
intense debate. See generally Wes Henricksen, Abay v. Ashcroft: The Six Circuit’s Baseless Expansion of INA Sec. 
101(A)(42)(A) Revealed A Gap in Asylum Law, 80 WASH. L. REV. 477, 482 (May 2005). 
133 See id. at 354. 
134 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996) 
135 See Henricksen, supra note 132, at 482. 
136 See Nwaokolo v. INS, 314 F.3d 303, 309 (7th Cir. 2002); Balogun v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 492, 499 (7th Cir. 
2004); Azanor v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1013, 1018-19 (9th Cir. 2004).  In Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, the Ninth Circuit 
held that the term persecution signifies more than “just restriction on life and liberty.” Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 
F. 2d 1448, 1452 (9th Cir. 1985). 
137 Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004).  
138 See id. at 640.  
139 Id.  
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derivative type of status remains controversial.  
The examples cited above demonstrate that the concept of ‘persecution’ can be 
understood in many different ways.  Even though there were many instances where the term has 
been interpreted in favor of claimants, especially whenever gender-related persecutions were 
involved as in the cases of Kedra Hassen Farah140 in Canada and Abay 141 in the United States, 
often ‘persecution’ is interpreted to the detriment of refugee status claimants.  It is much easier 
for the adjudicator to decide that a certain act does not amount to persecution than for the 
claimant to convince a court that it does, unless the act is manifestly atrocious and barbaric by 
nature.  Even when manifestly atrocious acts such as rape are concerned, some adjudicators seem 
to have found a way to deny status, as in the case of the Bosnian Serb victims.  Again, the use of 
the term “persecution” to denote a wide range of possibilities of jeopardy that a person may face 
directly reflects nations’ desire to retain a flexible policy of judging every instance according to 
their own standards.142
Whether the drafters of the Refugee Convention assumed that the persecutor only could 
be a government and its agents, or whether the drafters instead intended to include non-
government actors is unclear.  The Convention provides only, “a well-founded fear of 
persecution” without any reference to the nature of the persecutor.  Apparently, this phrase 
presupposes an identifiable agent that should carry out the persecution. The government or the 
ruling party could be identified as the persecutor.143  A problem may, however, arise when the 
feared persecution is perpetrated by non-state agents, either parties whose acts are tolerated by 
the government or parties that the government is unable to control.  Whenever the acts clearly 
 
140 Id. (citing Convention Refugee Determination Decision No. T93 - 12199- 12197 (May 1994)). 
141 Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004).  
142 See GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 12, at 193; see also HATHAWAY, supra note 12, at 99, nn.1-19.  
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are tolerated by the government, the controversy could be minimal.144  The greatest controversy 
arises whenever a person faces a serious jeopardy to his life due to acts of non-government 
agents. 
The response to this situation has also been varied.  Austrian adjudicators, for example, 
repeatedly have denied status to Bosnian Serb rape victims on the ground that the situation does 
not fit in the context the Convention.145 The Austrians claim that there should be a government 
and that the claimant should fear persecution by that government.146  On the other hand, some 
adjudicators have recognized that a person may have a valid refugee status claim under the 
Convention if he finds himself unprotected while there is a serious threat to his life so long as the 
threat is nationwide.147
In many jurisdictions, flight from generalized violence or civil wars is not perceived as 
being protected under the Convention.148 This is of course one of the reasons why refugees who 
flee generalized violence are not regarded as Convention refugees in most refugee receiving 
nations.149
4. Grounds of Persecution 
 
  The Convention provides for the protection of persons who have a well-founded fear of 
persecution based on any of five reasons: race, religion, nationality, a particular social group or 
 
143 See GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 12, at 189-191.  
144 See D. Cross, The Right of Asylum Under United States Law, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1125, 1139 (1980). 
145 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 109, at 240. 
146 Id. 
147 See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 14, at 74.  For example, in Acosta (Int. Doc. No.2986 (March 1, 1985)) the 
Immigration Appeals Board of the United States recognized the idea that as far as the person is not safe in his 
country, international protection is in fact required; however, the BIA added that the claimant must have exhausted 
every means in his home country, i.e., he should fear persecution nationwide. See id. at 74 n.189.   
148 See id. at 75. 
149 However, this category of persons can be regarded as convention refugees in Africa in the context of the OAU 
Convention Relating to the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,  because the OAU Convention defines a 
refugee as any person outside of his country due to any event disturbing public order. This category of persons can 
be called African Convention Refugees.  See OAU Convention, supra note 48, at Art. I.  
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political opinion.  Human beings can face persecution for various reasons; however, the category 
of persons that the Convention identifies as deserving of protection as refugees are persons who 
are persecuted for reason of these five categories.  The selection criteria might be understood 
from the historical context.150  The meaning of each one of the five grounds has been a subject of 
many scholarly studies and writings.  Although immense controversies are involved in 
ascertaining the exact meanings of all of these grounds, this article deals only with the grounds 
of social group and political opinion to demonstrate the difficulty in adjudication.   
a. Membership in a Particular Social Group 
 
One of the most obscure and immensely controversial concepts contained in the Convention 
definition of a refugee is the concept of “a particular social group.”  There is no indication in the 
Convention as to who exactly should be the beneficiary of this reference.151  Atel Grahl-Madsen 
says that whenever a person is likely to suffer persecution merely because of his background, he 
should get the benefit of the present provision,152 and he cites these examples: nobility, 
capitalists, business men, professional people, and farmers.153  UNHCR proposes that this 
category should encompass persons “with similar background, habits or social status.”154  In 
Matter of Acosta, the U.S. BIA interpreted the term “social group” to mean “persecution that is 
directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons all of whom share common 
immutable characteristics.”155  Based on the Board’s definition, Hathaway argues that it is 
appropriate to categorize the members of the following groups as members of the same social 
                                                             
150 See GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 12, at 217. 
151 See id. at 157. 
152 GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 12, at 219. 
153 See id. 
154 See UNHCR, HAND BOOK ON PROCEDURES, supra note 3. 
155 Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec.211 Board of Immigration Appeals (1985) 
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group: gender,156 sexual orientation,157 family,158 class or cast159 and voluntary associations.160
On one occasion, the UNHCR proposed to its executive committee a resolution to call 
upon contracting states to consider women as a particular social group as the term is contained in 
the Convention definition.161  However, for fear that such an interpretation “would imply 
criticism of certain religious beliefs or social or cultural practices,”162  the Committee did not 
adopt the proposed resolution as it was,163   but instead simply proposed that states may adopt 
such an interpretation.164  The Canadian IBR, by guidelines adopted in March of 1993, 
elaborated on gender based persecution.165  According to the guidelines, “a large number of 
people in general cannot constitute a particular social group but a group such as women who face 
[genital mutilation] constitutes a particular social group because that group suffers or will suffer 
severe discrimination or harsh or inhuman treatment that distinguishes it from the general 
population.”166  Bulgarian and Ecuadorian women vulnerable to domestic abuse and raped single 
women with a child born out of wedlock are some of the examples of the beneficiaries of the 
 
156 See HATHAWAY, supra note 12, at 162-63.   
157 See id. at 163-64 (detailed discussion of this category). 
158 See id. at 164-65 (detailed discussion of this category). 
159 See id. at 166-67 (detailed discussion of this category). 
160 See id at 167-69 (detailed discussion of this category). 
161 Kristine M. Fox, Note and comment: Gender persecution: Canadian Guidelines after a model for refugee 
Determination in the United States. 11 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW at 133 (citing Anders B. Johnson, The 
International Protection of Women Refugees: A Summary of Principal Problems and Issues, 1 INT'L J.  REFUGEE L. 




165 See Moussette, supra  note 112, at 369. 
166 See id. at 370.  Moussette comments: "The persecution occurs because they are women: Everyday, thousands of 
women are beaten in their homes by their partners, and thousands more are raped assaulted and sexually harassed. 
And these are the less recognized forms of violence. In Nepal, female babies die from neglect because parents value 
sons over daughters, in Sudan, girls' genitals are mutilated to ensure virginity until marriage; and in India, young 
brides are murdered by their husbands when parents fail to provide enough dowry.  In all of these instances, women 
are targets of violence because of their sex. This is not random violence; the risk factor is being female." Id. at n.166. 
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IBR’s definition of “social group.”167
In the case of Kedra Hassen Farah,168 the IBR identified and used three types of social 
groups to grant refugee status to Kedra H. Farah and her two minor children.  These groups are: 
the group that the mother belongs to, i.e., single mothers; the group to which the ten-year old girl 
belongs i.e., female minors at risk for FGM; and the group to which the seven year old boy 
belongs, minors that may be detached from their mothers.169    
On the other hand, the Austrian authorities on many occasions denied Bosnian Serb rape 
victims refugee status, among other reasons, on the grounds that the victims do not belong to any 
identifiable social group in the sense of the Convention.170  The Canadian Supreme Court in 
Attorney General v. Ward171 identified three possible categories of social groups: (1) groups 
possessing “innate or unchangeable characteristics;” (2) voluntary associations for reasons that 
are fundamentally important to their dignity; and (3) people associated with a former voluntary 
status.172   
 In Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS,173 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected a claim 
by Salvadorian young men who feared persecution because they belonged to a young working 
male group who were eligible for military service in El Salvador.174  Here, the court defined a 
particular social group to mean “a collection of people closely affiliated with each other who are 
 
167 Id. at n.180.  
168 Id. (citing Convention Refugee Determination Decision No. T93-121198, T93-12199, T93-12197 at 10 ( May 10, 
1994)), 
169 See id.  
170 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 109, at 240. 
171 Id. at n.208 (citing 103 D.L.R. 4th 1, 37 (1993)). 
172 See id. at 376.  The Court then categorized gender under the first definition. However, in Ward, the Court decided that 
the respondent, Ward, did not belong to any of the three groups and denied him refugee status. Ward was a former 
member of a para-military terrorist organization, the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), and he based his claim on 
his membership in INLA. He claimed that as a member he was assigned to guard the organization’s hostages whom he 
released because they were to be executed and as a result he was tortured and finally sentenced to death, which he 
managed to escape.  Id.   
173 Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1572 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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actuated by some common impulse or interest”175 and concluded that there never can be a social 
group that could be identified as “young working class males.”176  The Eighth Circuit also 
employed this definition.177  
  The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted the definition of “common 
immutable characteristics” used by the BIA, and based on this definition, the Third Circuit 
characterized sex as a social group category.178  To the contrary, the Ninth Circuit and the 
Second Circuit have expressly held that sex by itself is not sufficient to constitute an identifiable 
social group.179  Although a certain degree of clarity has been attained, particularly with regards 
to gender related persecution, the exact meaning of the term social group remains controversial. 
  b. Political Opinion       
  
    A person qualifies for refugee status if he has a well-founded fear of being persecuted 
because of his political opinion.  Like the definition of “social group,” the exact meaning of 
political opinion also has been a source of enormous confusion and uncertainty.  Atel Grahl-
Madsen argues that political opinion covers persons who are alleged or known to hold opinions 
contrary to or critical of the policies of the government or the ruling party.180  Goodwin-Gill 
suggests that “a typical ‘political refugee’ is one pursued by the government of a State or other 
entity on account of his or her opinions, which are an actual or perceived threat to that 
government or its institutions, or to the political agenda and aspirations of the entity in 
question.”181  Whenever the matter is so categorical that a person belongs to a certain opposition 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
174 Id. at 1572. 
175 See id. at 1576. 
176 Id. 
177 See, e.g., Safaire v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1994).  
178  See, e.g., Fatin v. INS, 12 .F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993). 
179 See Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1980). 
180 See GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 12, at 221. 
181 GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 4, at 49. 
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party and he fears persecution for the same reason, there could be little controversy.  A problem 
arises whenever a person’s cannot be clearly categorized as opposing or supporting certain 
policies because of his neutrality. 
Judicial interpretations of “political opinion,” as protected by the Convention, have been 
inconsistent.  For example, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Bolanos-Hernandez v. 
INS182 held that political neutrality can be considered to be a political opinion that would entitle 
a person to refugee status.183  The same court held differently in its decision in Zepeda-Melendez 
v. INS.184   In Zepeda-Melendez , the court opined that the applicant, a Salvadorian man who 
lived in a house that guerrillas used by day and government forces by night, and who refused to 
join either political group, faced no different danger than other non-committed Salvadorians in 
the country.185  Thus the applicant was not at risk because of political opinion.  
In Campos-Guardado v. INS,186 the applicant was raped immediately after her uncle was 
killed and also was threatened with death if she ever exposed the rapists. The Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit held that she did not qualify for refugee status because the threat was not due 
to her political opinion but because of the applicant’s personal situation.187  Contrary to the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision, the Ninth Circuit, in Lazo-Majano v. INS,188 held that a man who persecuted a 
woman who opposed his dominion could be considered as having persecuted her because of her 
political opinion.189  
 
182 Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984).  In this case, the applicant was an El Salvadorian man 
who alleged that he did not want to remain as a member of a right wing party and resisted joining the guerillas, 
which put his life in jeopardy.  See id.   
183 See id. 
184 Zepeda Melendez v. INS, 741 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1984). 
185 Id. at 290. 
186 Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987). 
187 Id. at 289-90. 
188 Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987) 
189 Id. 
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In INS v. Elias-Zacarias,190 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, said that:  
Elias-Zacarias appears to argue that not taking sides with any political faction is 
itself the affirmative expression of a political opinion.  That seems to us not 
ordinarily so, since we do not agree with the dissent that only a “narrow, grudging 
construction of the concept of ‘political opinion’ . . . would distinguish it from 
such quite different concepts as indifference, indecisiveness, and risk 
averseness.191
 
In this case, the Supreme Court held that forced participation in military service does not 
necessarily constitute persecution on account of political opinion.192   
The Canadian authorities also have given differing interpretations to the concept of 
political opinion.  For example, the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada in the Azam 
Faceed Narine case193 decided that, because the applicant had not demonstrated that he was a 
central figure in the political movement, he did not qualify for refugee status on the ground of 
political opinion.194  In another case, the Board decided in favor of an Iranian woman who 
refused to wear the chador and perform Islamic functions or rituals, on the ground that her 
refusal could be considered an anti-government position that could be viewed as political.195
As demonstrated above, “social group” and “political opinion” represent concepts that 
are very difficult to consistently apply in varying circumstances.  The results of past 
adjudications have, by and large, been dependent on the judicial philosophy and political 
opinions of the adjudicators.  As a result, inconsistency in application remains a challenge.  
 
190  502 U.S. 478 (1992). 
191 See id. at 483 (citation omitted).  Although the court did not decide this issue in this case, it has given a strong 
indication that it may not regard neutrality as holding a political opinion.  In response to the applicant’s claim that 
guerrilla forces would take him against his will and kill him, Justice Scalia replied: “It is quite plausible, indeed 
likely, that the taking would be engaged in by the guerrillas in order to augment their troops rather than show their 
displeasure; and the killing he feared might well be a killing in the course of resisting being taken.” See id. at n.2.  
192 Id. at 482. 
193 See HATHAWAY, supra note 12, at 153 n.128 (citing Azam Faceed Narine, Immigration Appeal Board Decision 
V79-614, C.L.I.C. Notes 15.15, at 5 (December 5, 1979). 
194 Id. at 153. 
195 Id. at 155 n.141. 
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B. Denial and Loss of Refugee Status 
Section A looked at the criteria for assignment of refugee status under the Refugee 
Convention.  The difficulty associated with the interpretation of the key terms also has been 
discussed in some detail.  This section deals with the problems involved in the adjudication of 
the denial of refugee status despite the fulfillment of all the requirements of the Convention, and 
loss of refugee status after it has already been granted.  
1. Denial of Refugee Status 
Article 1(D), (E), and (F) of the Convention provide for the exclusion of certain 
categories of persons who otherwise would be entitled to the benefits of the Convention.  These 
categories of persons are: (1) persons already receiving United Nations protection and 
assistance;196 (2) persons who are not considered to be in need of international protection 
because they have rights and obligations of nationals of the asylum country;197 (3) persons with 
respect to whom there are serious reasons to believe that they have committed crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and crimes against peace;198(4) persons with respect to whom there are 
serious reasons to believe have committed serious non-political crimes prior to their admission to 
the country of refuge;199 and (5) persons who have been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes 
 
196 The Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at art. 1D.  This provision essentially refers to the Palestinian refugees 
who were under the operation of the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA) in the Middle East.  
Because the UNRWA already was operational when the Convention was adopted, the parties agreed to exclude the 
Palestinians from assistance and protection by other UN Agencies, in particular the UNHCR.  The UNRWA was 
established by the General Assembly of the United Nations Resolution No. 302(IV), December 8, 1949.  Its 
operation is limited in the Middle East countries, in particular, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and the Gaza-strip.  See 
HATHAWAY, supra note 12, at n.100. 
197 The Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at art. 1E.  This provision was designed primarily to exclude refugees and 
expellees of German ethnic origin in the Federal Republic of Germany who, by virtue of Article 116 of the Basic 
Law, were Germans and who, although not possessing German nationality, were treated as if they were German 
nationals.  See Paul Weis, The Concept of the Refugee in International Law, 87 JOURNAL DU DROIT INT’L 929, 978 
(1960).  However, its current importance is doubtful.  
198 The Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at art. 1F(a).  See discussion infra section a.  
199 Id. at art. 1F(b).  See discussion infra section b. 
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and principles of the United Nations.200  Because most adjudicative problems of current 
importance relate to a refugee’s past crimes, this section considers only the third and fourth 
categories.  
a. Persons Who Are Believed to Have Committed Crimes against Peace, 
War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity 
 
These are persons who are believed to be undeserving of international protection even if 
they meet the criteria for refugee status.201  Two main policy considerations underlie the 
formulation of this provision: (1) these persons may be criminals and as such do not deserve 
protection202 and (2) these persons possibly could be dangerous to the community of the asylum 
country.203   
The international instruments204 referred to as defining a war crime or a crime against 
humanity include the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal, an annex to the 
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European 
Axis concluded on the 8th of August 1945.205  Article VI of this charter defines crimes against 
                                                             
200 Id. at art. 1F(c).  At the Conference of Plenipotentiaries in 1951, the French delegation suggested that the  
“provision was not aimed at the man-in-the street, but at persons occupying government posts, such as heads of 
States, ministers and high officials....[Whenever] mention was made of a refugees, that was to say of victims of 
persecution , it was because it was assumed that there were also authors of such persecution. By a turn of events the 
persecutor might himself become a refugee.”  GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 12, at 283.  (quoting representative of the 
French delegation, Remarks at the Conference of the Plenipotentiaries (1951), UN doc. E/AC.7/SR. 166,6.) 
201 The provision reads: 
The provisions of this convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there is serious 
reason for considering that he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against 
humanity as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such 
crimes. 
The Refugee Convention, supra  note 3, at art. 1F(a). 
202 See HATHAWAY, supra note 12, at 214. 
203 Id. 
204 Instrument(s) in the plural suggests that there is at least more than one such instrument.  The other instruments 
(other than the London Charter which is referred below) could be the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 
10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm, for it 
refers to serious non-political crimes (although it does not define them), and the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, approved Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter The Genocide 
Convention].  See generally GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 12, at 272; see also GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 4, at 98. 
205 The London Charter, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. 
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peace as including “planning, preparation, institution or waging of a war of aggression, or a war 
in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan 
or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.”206  War crimes include “murder, 
ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor . . . killing of hostages, plunder of public or private 
property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military 
necessity.”207  Crimes against humanity include “murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation . . . or persecution on political, racial or religious grounds.”208       
  This exclusion clause thus applies to any person who is believed to have committed any 
of these acts.  The language of this provision is mandatory, and hence if a state believes that a 
person has committed any of these acts, the state cannot grant refugee status even if it wishes to 
do so.209  In addition, states need not prove that the person has committed the acts or is in fact 
guilty of the allegation; it is enough that there are serious grounds for considering it to be so.  
The greatest difficulty relates to ascertaining what constitutes serious grounds for 
considering that the individual committed a crime.  The Convention does not provide for how 
this issue should be considered, so states apply their own standards.  Further, a number of issues 
of criminal law must be addressed prior to denying a person’s refugee status on these grounds.  
What makes the inquiry extremely difficult is that the adjudicator must essentially consider 
events that might have occurred at some unknown location, and in an unknown time and manner. 
 There almost always is no evidence, only allegations and suspicions. 
The standard of “serious reasons for considering” is not a very well defined concept.  
According to the UNHCR, the criminal standard of proof, i.e. “beyond reasonable doubt” need 
 
206 Id. at art. VI(a). 
207 Id. at art. VI(b).  
208 Id. at art. VI(c).  
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not be met; conversely, the preponderance of the evidence standard employed in civil cases 
might be too low a threshold.210  UNHCR suggests that “[g]iven the rigorous manner in which 
indictments are put together by international criminal tribunals, however, indictment by such 
bodies, in UNHCR’s view, satisfies the standard of proof required by Article 1F.” 211  
States employ differing criteria in this respect.  Evidence of involvement in criminal 
conduct of this nature usually comes from the applicants’ own statements.  In the absence of 
such statements, identification of “a serious reason for considering” that the applicant has 
committed war crimes or crimes against humanity is extremely difficult unless the applicant is a 
well-known political figure.  Precisely because of this difficulty, cases elaborating this standard 
are limited.  The available case law deals primarily with whether some known conduct (whether 
known because of the applicant’s admission or otherwise) constitutes an excludable offense.     
For example, in one Australian case, a Liberian man involved in the civil war stated the 
following in his application: “I took part in about 6 of these riots and although I did not wish to 
kill anybody, I knew either I had to shoot them or I would be shot.  However, I always avoided 
shooting anyone in the head or chest because I knew that would mean instant death for them, 
instead aiming only at their legs or arms.”212  This claimant essentially admitted that he might 
have killed people, although he claimed to have done so under duress.  The court determined that 
the claimant’s acts constituted war crimes or crimes against humanity; however, it accepted his 
duress argument.  The Australian court observed that the applicant “attempted to lessen the 
impact of the orders to kill by shooting in a manner to avoid killing anyone,” and found the 
 
209 See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 4, at 98-99.  
210 UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection, Background Note on The Application of The Exclusion Clauses: 
Article 1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to The Status of Refugees, 15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 502, 541 (2003). 
211 Id. 
212 MUSALO ET AL., supra note 12, at 706. 
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claims plausible and credible.213  However, there certainly was a serious reason to consider that 
this claimant has committed a crime.  The only piece of evidence, apart from country condition 
reports, is the applicant’s own statement, and credibility was the determining factor.  The 
difficulty associated with credibility determination is discussed under section V below.   
The United States does not have a statutory equivalent to this Refuge Convention 
provision.  The closest provision to this bar is what is commonly known as the “Persecutors of 
Others Bar.”214  The US Immigration Act provides: “The term refugee does not include any 
person who ordered, incited, assisted or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person 
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.”215  The Attorney General and, ultimately, the U.S. courts must determine whether or 
not an applicant has been involved in the persecution of others, and must make this 
determination based essentially on evidence presented by the claimant.  Again, the case law 
mainly addresses the extent of criminal culpability based on the claimant’s own statements and 
some scant evidence.  
  For example, in Matter of Rodriguez-Majano,216 the claimant testified that he was 
forcibly recruited to a guerrilla force opposing the Salvadorian government.217  The claimant 
admitted to having received military training and giving cover to others in the group while they 
 
213 Id. at 711-12.  The Canadian Immigration Appeals Board in the Felix Salatiel Nuñez Veloso case gave a similar 
decision.  It considered the issue of the actual criminal responsibility of an applicant and decided that the particular 
applicant, a Chilean torturer, had committed the crime under duress and thus the exclusion clause did not apply to 
him.  Immigration Appeal Board Decision 79-1017, C.L.I.C. Notes 11.5 (Aug. 24, 1979) (quoted in HATHAWAY, 
supra note 12, at 218).  Hathaway says, “Yet the Board failed to inquire whether the human suffering induced by 
Mr. Nuñez Veloso’s actions outweighed the risk to his own well-being, an essential finding for exculpation under 
the doctrine of coercion.”  Id. 
214 See MUSALO ET AL., supra note 12, at 721.  
215 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (1982). 
216 Matter of Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 811 (BIA 1988), reprinted in part in MUSALO ET AL., supra note 
12, at 722-25.  
217 MUSALO ET AL., supra note 12, at 723. 
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burned cars.218  The immigration judge determined that was a sufficient ground to exclude him 
from refugee status because the claimant’s involvement constituted acts of persecution.219   The 
BIA, however, reversed the decision, stating that “[w]e do not believe Congress intended to 
restrict asylum and withholding only to those who had taken no part in armed conflict . . . harm 
resulting from generalized civil strife is not persecution.”220   
Again, the main body of evidence that the BIA relied on was the claimant’s statement.  
His credibility was essentially outcome determinative. The importance of credibility in asylum 
proceedings is discussed in Section V below in some detail.  
b. Persons Who Are Believed to Have Committed a Serious Non-Political 
Crime  
 
Article 1F(b) of the Convention states that “[t]he provisions of this Convention shall not 
apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has 
committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to the admission to 
that country as a refugee.”221
In addition to the problems this provision shares with Article 1F(a) discussed above, this 
provision also poses a very critical problem of interpretation because adjudicators must 
determine what constitutes a “serious non-political crime.”  No authoritative definition of this 
term exists.  The concern behind this provision seems to be that common fugitives from justice 
may abuse the institution of asylum.222  Nonetheless, identification of these groups is an 
extremely difficult task both in terms of ascertaining facts and in terms of categorizing crimes as 
                                                             
218 Id.  
219 Id.  In addition to this ground, the immigration judge’s denial was based on credibility issues.  The judge did not 
find the claims claim to having been forcibly recruited credible because, according to the judge, other background 
information suggested that forcible guerrilla recruitment did not begin until after the date that the claimant alleged to 
have been recruited.  See id. at n.2.  
220 Id. at 724-25.  
221 The Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at art. 1F(b).  
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serious and non-serious, political and non-political. 
Commentators and legal authorities vary in their understanding of “serious crime” for 
purposes of refugee status.  Grahl-Madsen says a crime is serious when it warrants a substantial 
penalty, including the death penalty or deprivation of liberty for several years.223  He adds that it 
could also be a crime of a more trivial nature but perpetrated in such a manner that its very 
wickedness makes its perpetrator liable to a penalty more severe than the penalty that is 
ordinarily imposed for such crimes.224  Goodwin-Gill suggests that crimes are deemed serious 
when they are perpetrated against physical integrity, life and liberty.225  The UNHCR proposes 
that the following acts can be characterized as serious crimes: homicide, rape, child molestation, 
wounding, arson, drug trafficking, and armed robbery.226  Paul Weis suggests that what has to be 
measured is whether “the criminal character of the individual outweighs his refugee 
character.”227  The Convention, however, leaves this determination to the discretion of the states, 
and states apply it according to their domestic standards.  Thus crimes may be considered serious 
in one state and non-serious in others.  
Determination of the political nature of the crime is the other problem.  Definitionally, 
political offenses include “an attack on the political order of things established in the country 
where committed and even to include offenses committed to obtain any political object.”228    
However, even when the attack clearly is on the “political order,” the classification could be 
problematic.  Goodwin-Gill comments that the nature and purpose of the offense must be 
examined in light of the motive, specifically: whether the offense was committed out of genuine 
 
222 See HATHAWAY, supra note 12, at 221.  
223 GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 12, at 297. 
224 Id. at 294.  
225 GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 4, at 105. 
226 See id. 
227 GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 12, at 297 (quoting Paul Weis, UN Doc. HCR/INF/49.29). 
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political motive or merely for personal reasons, whether its commission was directed at the 
modification of the political organization or the structure of the state, and whether there was a 
direct causal nexus between the crime committed and its alleged political object.229  He 
concludes that: “The political element should in principle outweigh the common law character of 
the offence, which may not be the case if the acts committed are grossly disproportionate to the 
objective, or are of an atrocious or barbarous nature.”230
The US equivalent of this provision follows the Convention verbatim.231 Adopting the 
standard quoted above, in McMullen v. INS232 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied 
relief to a former Irish Republican Army member who was involved in the bombing of two 
military barracks, training of militants, and coordination of illegal arms smuggling.233  In 
Aguirre-Aguirre v. INS,234 the claimant testified that he took part in the burning of ten buses and 
the messing of several stores as a means of demonstrating against the Guatemalan 
government.235  The BIA denied refugee status based on these acts.236  The Ninth Circuit 
disagreed and reversed, but the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately upheld the BIA’s original 
finding, holding that the BIA could permissibly deny refugee status because of non-political 
crimes without consideration of the claimant’s risk of political persecution upon return to his 
home country.237
 
228 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1319 (4th ed. 1951). 
229  GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 4, at 105-06. 
230 Id.  The UNHCR adopts a similar approach.  For details, see HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES, supra note 3.   
231 See INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(iii) (codified as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii) (Supp. V 1999)). 
232 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986), reprinted in part in MUSALO ET AL., supra note 12, at 726.  
233 Id.  
234 121 F.3d 521 (9th Cir. 1997), reprinted in part in MUSALO ET AL., supra note 12, at 727.   
235 Id.  
236 Id.  
237 Id. at 732.  Another reason for the Supreme Court’s reversal was the Ninth Circuit’s consideration of the UNHCR 
Guidelines, which provide that the risk of persecution must be balanced with the claimant’s conduct. According to 
the Supreme Court, the Handbook’s Guidelines are not binding, and as such may not be strictly followed.  See id. at 
733.  
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As is evidenced from the forgoing, the facts warranting denial of refugee status based on 
commission of crimes also has been a subject of inconsistent interpretation and application.  
Guidance is needed to clarify the meaning and the legal tests that properly should apply in such 
cases.    
2. Loss of Refugee Status 
The Convention contains clauses that provide for situations where a recognized refugee 
might lose his status as a refugee. These clauses are commonly referred to as cessation clauses.  
According to the cessation clauses contained under Article 1C of the Convention, a person may 
cease to be a refugee based on his own voluntary acts or based on a change of circumstances.238  
Further, Article 1C. 5 of the Convention provides that if the circumstances that forced a refugee 
out of his country no longer persistent, then the refugee ceases to be a refugee.239  In the sense of 
this provision, it is appropriate to consider changes including the collapse of a regime that the 
refugee antagonized, the secession of a territory, and the victory of a rebel movement to be clear 
evidence of change of circumstances that may give rise to the revocation of one’s refugee 
status.240
When the situation is clear, such as when a refugee belonged to a certain persecuted 
political group and the group seizes power, allowing the refugee to return without fear, the 
 
238 The Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at art. 1C. This provision states: 
The convention shall cease to apply to any person falling under the terms of section A if … he can 
no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a 
refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of 
his nationality. 
Id.  The other grounds include: “(1) He has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his 
nationality; or (2) Having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily re-acquired it; or (3) He has acquired a new 
nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his new nationality; or (4) He has voluntarily re-established 
himself in the country which he left or out side of which he remained owing to fear of persecution.” See id.  The 
meanings of these provisions are less controversial.  As such, a discussion is not included in this article. 
239 Id.  The only exception is a compelling reason to refuse to go back due to reasons arising out of the former 
persecution.  See id.  
240 See GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 12, at 401. 
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application of this provision is not problematic. However, because most situations are not as 
clear and categorical as this, the application of this provision inevitably involves serious 
difficulties with regards to what circumstances must change and to what extent.  Hathaway 
writes:  
First the change must be of substantial political significance, in the sense that the 
power structure under which persecution was deemed a real possibility no longer 
exists.  The collapse of the persecutory regime, coupled with the holding of 
genuinely free and democratic elections, the assumption of power by a government 
committed to human rights, and a guaranty of fair treatment for enemies of the 
predecessor regime by way of amnesty or otherwise, is the appropriate indicator of a 
meaningful change of circumstances.241
 
Even if there is agreement that a change of circumstances, as referred to in the Convention, 
should include all these factors or should be interpreted this way, the state of refuge still must 
determine whether elections are free and fair and whether the new government is committed to 
human rights.  Such determinations are, in most cases, dependent on the relationship that the 
country of refuge may have with the new government of the refugee’s home country. 
 One of the greatest challenges in this area is the lack of consensus among evaluators of 
human rights records and the genuineness of elections and institutionalization of democratic 
systems of countries that had produced refugees for a long time.   
One good example of a possible abuse is the declaration by the Libyan President Colonel 
Moammar Kadafi in 1993.  He declared that the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement changed 
the circumstances in connection with which the Palestinians were accepted as refugees in Libya, 
and hence over 30,000 of them had to be repatriated to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.242   
Objective assessment of change of circumstances is exceedingly problematic. Often 
United States adjudicators rely on State Department Human Rights Reports and related news 
 
241 HATHAWAY, supra note 12, at 200 (footnotes omitted).  
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sources.  For example, in Quevedo et al. v. Ashcroft,TPF243FPT the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
affirmed the BIA’s denial of asylum on change of circumstances grounds.  The claimant was a 
Guatemalan citizen who belonged to a political movement that signed a peace accord after thirty-
six years of civil war.TPF244FPT  The court essentially relied on a 1996 U.S. State Department Human 
Rights Report and some related reports, which stated that the situation had changed for the better 
after the peace accord.TPF245FPT  The court recognized that there were still some problems but 
nonetheless considered the situation safe enough for the claimant to return.TPF246FPT  The court quoted 
the claimant as saying: “[b]ecause with a paper and a pencil there is never going to be peace in 
one country . . . .” TPF247FPT  The court did not accept the claimant’s rationale.  Nevertheless, a question 
might be asked: how often do nations jump from decades of civil war to a democratic order with 
the signing of a peace accord?   
A very good example demonstrating the misuse of change of circumstances is Roble v. 
Canada.TPF248FPT  In Roble, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeals rejected an application by a 
Somalian refugee on a change of circumstances grounds. TPF249FPTP P The applicant claimed refugee status 
based on fear of persecution by the security forces of former Somali President Ziad Barre.  While 
the case was still being considered, the Barre government toppled.  The Court, however, 
considered the change of circumstances sufficient to deny refugee status. TPF250FPT  Interestingly, the 
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PT See Frederick B. Baer, International Refugees as Political Weapons, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 243, 244 (1996). 
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PT 336 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2003).  
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PT Id. at 41-42. 
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PT Id.  
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PT Id.  
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247
PT Id. at 42.  
TP
248
PT Roble v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), No. A-1101-91, 47 A.C.W.S. (3d) 823 (Fed. Ct. 
App. Apr. 25, 1994), available at 1994 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 70543; also available at 
HThttp://www.refugeecaselaw.org/cases_files/CORE%20COLLECTION/case_651_1.pdfTH (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).  
TP
249
PT See id. at 43-45.  
TP
250
PT The claimant knew that the change was not for the better but for the worse; however, he was not sure as what 
would happen to him.  The court held that against him.  His testimony was as follows: “COUNSEL: Do you think 
the fact that you worked for a government agency such as the airlines could cause you some difficulties now in 
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change turned out to be for the worse.  Although the circumstances were obvious even at that 
point, evidently the court completely overlooked the magnitude of the Somali problem.  That is 
not a very uncommon phenomenon in refugee status adjudications.   
IV. BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF IN REFUGEE STATUS DETERMINATIONS 
Almost all jurisdictions require that the claimant for refugee status prove that he or she is 
a refugee.TPF251FPT  In the United States, a person seeking asylum must prove that he or she is a refugee 
by proving past persecution or a well founded fear of future persecution because of race, 
religion, nationality, membership to a social group or political opinion. TPF252FPTP P    
This burden requires proving each and every essential element of the claim.  The 
difficulty associated with ascertaining the exact meanings of these elements has been discussed 
in Section III above.  This section discusses the difficulty associated with proving the facts.   
The set of circumstances that often leads to a person’s flight to safety almost invariably 
prevent the collection of evidence that may help prove facts.  That makes refugee status 
adjudication a unique type of legal proceeding, which purports to determine the occurrence or 
non-occurrence of alleged events in some distant place based primarily on the claimant’s own 
statement.  As a result, credibility constitutes the most important factor in refugee status 
determination.  It could fairly be said that asylum jurisprudence is by and large a credibility 
jurisprudence.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Somalia?  CLAIMANT: It is possible. It is possible that those who are opposed to the government might inflict me 
with some harm, but I do not know for sure.”  See id. at 22.  The court concluded that “The applicant’s submission 
that there was insufficient evidence to support the conclusion of an effective and durable change of circumstances is 
therefore unfounded.”  Id. at 46.  
TP
251
PT See, e.g., Canadian Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, Consolidated Statutes and Regulations, Part II, Div. 
2, § 100(4), available at HThttp://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/I-2.5/64943.html#rid-64998TH (last visited Nov. 14, 2005). 
TP
252
PT 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158 (West 2005).  A related but separate relief under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231 (West 2005) is 
withholding of removal.  To be eligible for withholding of removal, a person must prove that his life or liberty would 
be threatened if he or she is returned to his country if origin.  Under this category, the person must prove a clear 
probability of persecution.  See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440-41 (1987); see also INS v. Stevic, 467 
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Determining one’s credibility is an exceedingly difficult task.  The Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS, now called Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, BCIS) 
regulations state: “[t]he testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the 
burden of proof without corroboration.” TPF253FPT    
The various circuit courts generally have endorsed variations of the same proposition.  
For example, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that an asylum applicant’s 
exclusive reliance on his own testimony to establish a well-founded fear of persecution “in itself 
is not necessarily fatal to his petition, but it places a premium on the content of that 
testimony.”TPF254FPTP P The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consistently disapproved any 
mandatory requirements for corroboration as long as the claimant’s statement is credible.TPF255FPTP P  
The Real ID Act TPF256FPTP Pmaintained the rule that the applicant’s credible testimony may be 
sufficient to sustain the burden of proof; however, it reversed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on 
corroboration.  The Act states:  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
U.S. 407, 428 (1984).  The INS regulations provide: “The burden of proof is on the applicant for asylum to establish 
that he or she is a refugee.”  8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2000). 
TP
253
PT INS Regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2000); see also Korniejew v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 377 (7th Cir. 2004). 
TP
254
PT INA § 101(a)(42)(A) (codified as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000)).  See also Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 611 
(7th Cir. 2003), cited in Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Necessity and Sufficiency of Evidence Corroborating Alien’s 
Testimony to Establish Basis for Asylum or Withholding of Removal, 179 A.L.R. Fed. 357 at 79 (West 2002-2005). 
TP
255
PT Disapproving any BIA requirements that corroborating evidence be produced where it is reasonably expected and 
no explanation is given for its non-production.  See summaries of Lopez-Cabrera v. INS, No. 98-70047, 2000 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 23403 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2000) and Vizcardo-Llamas v. INS, No. 99-70713, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 
21810 (9th Cir. Oct. 10, 2001), cited in Kemper, supra note 254, at 72.  However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit has ruled that failure to produce available relevant corroborative evidence may give rise to an inference that 
it might be unfavorable.  See Omoregbee v. INS, No. 93-70883, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 29349 (9th Cir. Aug. 3, 
1995), cited in Kemper, supra note 254, at 72.  See also Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2000) (“We are 
not free to consider as an open question whether the BIA has hit upon a permissible interpretation of the INA, for the 
law we must follow is already set out for us: this court does not require corroborative evidence.”) (internal quotation 
and citation omitted); see also Cordon-Garcia v. INS, 204 F.3d 985, 992-93 (9th Cir. 2000) (“This court recognizes 
the serious difficulty with which asylum applicants are faced in their attempts to prove persecution, and has adjusted 
the evidentiary requirements accordingly.”) (citation omitted). 
TP
256
PT The Bill, labeled H.R. 418, passed in the House of Representatives on February 10, 2005.  It was attached to the 
emergency spending bill on Iraq and Tsunami aid (H.R. 1268) and then passed by the House.  On May 10, the Act 
was passed by the U.S. Congress and then signed into law by President Bush on May 11, 2005.  See Human Rights 
First, Real ID Act Endangers People Fleeing Persecution, 
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[w]here the trier of fact determines, in the trier of fact’s discretion, that the 
applicant should provide evidence which corroborates otherwise credible 
testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have the 
evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence without departing the United 
States.  The inability to obtain corroborating evidence does not excuse the 
applicant from meeting the applicant’s burden of proof.TPF257FPT 
    
According to this new law, even if the trier of fact is convinced that the applicant’s testimony is 
credible, he or she may require additional evidence.  The applicant’s inability to obtain the 
evidence could be fatal to his or her case.  This particular rule is a significant addition to the 
applicant’s burden of proof.    
The Real ID Act makes it clear that “there is no presumption of credibility,” TPF258FPT and 
provides some guidance as to how credibility must be determined.  It states:  
The trier of fact should consider all relevant factors and may, in the trier of fact’s 
discretion, base the trier of fact’s determination on any such factor, including the 
demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness … the 
consistency of such statements with other evidence of record (including the 
reports of the Department of State on country conditions), and any inaccuracies or 
falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, 
inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.TPF259FPT 
   
Precisely because of the obvious additions to the burden of proof on asylum applicants, 
the Act was a subject of widespread criticism by human rights and immigrant groups.TPF260FPT P PThe 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
HTwww.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/asylum_10_sensenbr.aspTH (last visited Nov. 3, 2005). 
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PT Id. § 101(c), adding new INA § 240(c)(4)(C).  
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PT See, e.g., Letter from over 50 Asian Pacific American Organizations to ‘Senator’ (Apr. 11, 2005), 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/pdf/realid/apasenatesignon-041205.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2005); Letter 
from National Network to End Violence Against Immigrant Women to ‘Senator’ (Mar. 29, 2005), 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/pdf/realid/antiviolence-033005.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2005); Letter from 
over 80 organizations and individuals to ‘Senator’ (Apr. 7, 2005), 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/pdf/realid/over80-opp-040705%20.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2005). The Act 
also was the subject of extensive press coverage.  See, e.g., Dawn Herzog Jewell, Death Sentence? Immigration bill 
could jeopardize asylum seekers, critics say, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Mar. 8, 2005, available at 
HThttp://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2005/004/3.26.htmlTH; Lin Piwowarczyk, Op-Ed, Unwelcome Mat, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Feb. 25, 2005, available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2005/02/25/unwelcome_mat/; Editorial, On 
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provisions that attracted more intense criticism are the corroboration provision, indicated above, 
and the reliance on demeanor as indicative of credibility.  For example, commenting on the 
inclusion of demeanor as an element of credibility, Human Rights First observed that “[u]nder 
the Real ID Act, refugees will be denied asylum [b]ecause they do not look a judge in the eye … 
or [b]ecause they cannot talk about rape with a male immigration officer.” TPF261FPTP  PHuman Rights 
First concludes that demeanor is a poor indicator of credibility because people from different 
cultures have different manners of communicating with authority figures.TPF262FPTP P  Even without 
cultural differences, psychological studies have found that reliance on demeanor is a poor 
method of determining the truth or falsity of utterances. TPF263FPT  Other studies have shown that in 
criminal investigation cases, trained police officers performed slightly better than chance, but 
absolutely no better than untrained personnel. TPF264FPT  
The Act also raises the standard of review with respect to corroboration.  It states: “No 
court shall reverse a determination made by a trier of fact with respect to availability of 
corroborating evidence …unless the court finds that a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to 
conclude that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.”TPF265FPTP P his addition clearly subjects the 
standard of review for the legal question of whether or not corroborating evidence is needed to a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Guard America, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2005, at A18, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/15/opinion/15tue3.html?ex=1142744400&en=394621cc6e2c29d7&ei=5070; 
Doris Meissner, Commentary, Not Broke, Don’t Fix, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 20 2005, available at 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/commentary/20050219-092415-7342r.htm (last visited on Nov. 3, 2005). 
TP
261
PT See Human Rights First, Real ID Act Endangers People Fleeing Persecution, 
HTwww.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/asylum_10_sensenbr.aspTH (last visited Nov. 3, 2005). 
TP
262
PT Id.  
TP
263
PT See Juliet Cohen, Questions of Credibility: Omissions, Discrepancies and Errors of Recall in the Testimony of Asylum 
Seekers, 13 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 293, 308 (2001), cited in Michael Kagan, Is the Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? 
Objective Credibility Assessment in Refugee Status Determination, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 367, 379 n. 45 (2003). 
TP
264
PT See Alders Vrij & Samantha Mann, Telling and Detecting Lies in a High-Stake Situation: The Case of a Convicted 
Murderer, 15 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 187 (2001), cited in Kagan, supra note 263, at 379 n.46. 
TP
265
PT The Real ID Act, supra note 257, § 101(d), amending INA § 242(b)(4)(D).  
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simple deferential standard that ordinarily applies to factual questions.TPF266FPTP P  This would essentially 
mean that an immigration judge’s findings of credibility and availability of corroborating 
evidence would remain unchallenged.   
The Act’s modification of the existing standard of review for clear questions of fact is 
minor.  Current law states: “The administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any 
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” TPF267FPTP P Interpreting this 
provision, the Supreme Court, in INS v. Elias-Zacarias, TPF268FPT found that reversal of factual 
determinations by a reviewing court is warranted only when the evidence compels such a 
reversal.  It is not sufficient that the evidence may support a contrary finding, but rather that the 
evidence must compel a contrary conclusion.TPF269FPTP P 
Regardless of the specific statutory and judicial guidance concerning the review of 
factual findings of immigration judges, the reality is that the findings of immigration judges 
almost invariably stand.  The recent restructuring of the BIA has made the deferral to 
immigration court findings nearly mandatory.  Introducing the reform, former Attorney General 
John Ashcroft, in a statement issued on August 23, 2002, said: “[T]he regulations bring the 
Board’s standards of review into conformity with appellate courts throughout the country, which 
address legal issues  de novo (anew) while deferring to the factual findings of lower courts.  
Prior to these reforms, the Board had routinely addressed factual questions de novo . . . .”TPF270FPTP  PThe 
                                                             
TP
266






PT INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 484 (1992).   
TP
269
PT Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia said: “And if he seeks to obtain judicial reversal of the BIA’s 
determination, he must show that the evidence he presented was so compelling that no reasonable fact-finder could 
fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.”  Id. at 483-84.  
TP
270
PT Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Attorney General Issues Final Rule Reforming Board of Immigration 
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reform also reduced the number of BIA judges reviewing each case from three to one.TPF271FPTP P  
The result of this reform was dramatic: it increased the BIA’s adjudicative efficiency by 
almost 100 percent.TPF272FPT  What that efficiency indicates is a subject of immense controversy.  
Evidently, the BIA’s asylum grant rate went down from 23 percent in 2001 to 2 percent in 
2002.TPF273FPT  Within the first six months alone, the backlog went down from 56,000 to 47,000.TPF274FPT  
Statistics show that currently about 224 immigration judges TPF275FPT receive more than 270,000 cases a 
year.TPF276FPT  Among them, more than 56,000 of the cases seek relief in the form of asylum.  
According to official statistics, less than one quarter of them actually are granted asylum.TPF277FPT    
Appeal to the BIA has become a futile exercise, with only 2 percent to 4 percent grant 
rates.TPF278FPTP P  In fact, a series of policy and administrative changes effected since 2001 have caused 
asylum applications to decline significantly.  According to BCIS statistics, in fiscal year 2001, 
103,499 applications were received.  By 2002 that number had fallen to 89,726.  By the year 
                                                             
TP
271
PT Id.  The BIA originally had five judges altogether, but that number was increased to 23 in 2002 to implement the 
new procedures.  The number was subsequently reduced to 11.  See U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office For 
Immigration Review, Fiscal Years 2005-2010, Strategic Plan, at 6 (Sept. 2004), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/FinalTEREOIRStrategicPlan2005-2010September%202004.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Strategic Plan]. 
TP
272
PT U.S. Department of Justice, Fact Sheet, Board of Immigration Appeals: Final Rule, at 2 (Aug. 23, 2002), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/02/BIARulefactsheet.pdfHH (last visited Nov. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Fact Sheet]. 
TP
273
PT See U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Report on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal, vol. 
I, at 34, HThttp://www.uscif.gov/countries/global/asylum_refugees/2005/february/THVolume%20I.pdf (last visited Oct. 
2005) [hereinafter Report on Asylum Seekers vol. I]. 
TP
274
PT Id.  
TP
275
PT See Strategic Plan, supra note 271, at 6. 
TP
276
PT Fact Sheet, supra note 272, at 2.  
TP
277
PT U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review, Office of Planning, Analysis and 
Technology, Immigration Courts FY 2004 Asylum Statistics at 9, HThttp://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/FY04AsyStats.pdfTH 
(last visited Oct. 2005).  The exact figures for 2004 are: 56,609 asylum applications were adjudicated; among them, 
10,839 were granted and 20,867 were denied.  The remaining applications were withdrawn, abandoned, or classified 
under the category of “other.”  Only a very small percentage were granted conditional relief.  See id.  
TP
278
PT See Report on Asylum Seekers vol. I, supra note 273, at 34, 56.  For example, in 2002, only 19 of 1251 appeals 
were sustained; in 2004, only 49 of 2879 were sustained.  See id.  Some suggest that the reason for the decline 
results from the change in the composition of the BIA judges with the removal of five who were considered liberal.  
See, e.g., Tanya Weinberg & Ruth Morris, Gatekeepers; Who Gets Asylum? Experts Warn Bias Might Be Swaying 
Judges’ Decisions, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, July 3, 2005, available at 
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2003, it had fallen further to 42,705 i.e., less than 50 percent of what it was in 2001.TPF279FPT  The 
2004 volume was by far the lowest it has been since the enactment of the 1980 Immigration 
Act,TPF280FPT which brought the US in compliance with the 1967 UN Refugee Protocol.TPF281FPTP P   
According to the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, there is a great 
disparity between the grant rates of individual judges.TPF282FPT  One extreme example is the disparity in 
the grant rates of a South Florida immigration court.  While one judge averaged a lower than 2 
percent grant rate, another judge within the same court averaged about a 75 percent grant rate.TPF283FPTP 
 
PThis is a prime demonstration of the role of subjective assessment of objective fear.  Because 
this phenomenon is very well known among immigrants and immigration lawyers, in the 
majority of cases, for all practical purposes, the results of cases are known by the mere fact of 
their assignment to one judge or another. 
 The Commission said that, in nearly 40 percent of immigration judge decisions where 
relief was denied, the ground for denial was inconsistency between the claimant’s testimony and 
his or her prior statements to an immigration inspector or an immigration officer.TPF284FPT  In nearly 
one-quarter of denials, the ground was lack of credibility because of added details.TPF285FPTP P  
Commenting on cultural differences regarding what is considered an important detail in life, 
                                                             
TP
279
PT See U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2003, Refugees and Asylees at 50 
(table 12), http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook/2003/2003RA.pdf (last visited, Nov. 4, 2005) 
[hereinafter Yearbook of Immigration Statistics]; see also Press Release, Human Rights First, Human Rights First 
Condemns Passage of Real ID Act Punishing Victims of Persecution, Core American Principles Sacrificed in 
Largely Unnoticed Law (May 11, 2005), http://humanrightsfirst.org/media/2005_alerts/asy_0511_realid.htm (last 
visited Oct. 2005).  
TP
280
PT See Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, supra note 279, at 50.  According to UNHCR, this trend has been noted 
in all developed countries since 2001.  See Refugees by Numbers (2005 Edition), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/basics/opendoc.htm?tbl=BASICS&id=3b028097c#Asylum%20seekers (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).  
TP
281
PT See Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 
1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9 (1981) (for a detailed discussion of the legislative history).  
TP
282
PT See Report on Asylum Seekers vol. I, supra note 273, at 56.   
TP
283
PT Weinberg & Morris, supra note 278.  Commenting on such disparity, Professor David Marin said: “One’s 
comfort level can’t be very high with this kind of inconsistency.”  See id.  
TP
284
PT Id.  
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Michael Kagan, who had a chance to observe refugee status determinations in Egypt, said that 
Sudanese refugees often struggled to remember their birthdates or wedding dates because such 
events are neither recorded nor considered important in southern Sudanese society. TPF286FPTP P 
The writer of this article also encountered refugees in East Africa who had to struggle to 
remember the number, names, and ages of their children.  These situations do not create any 
serious adjudicative problems in Africa because almost invariably, refugees flee well known and 
recognized hardships and as such the UNHCR considers them prima facie refugees.  However, 
the refugees face problems in trying to establish their refugee status for resettlement to third 
countries that may use different cultural standards.  
Under the existing system in the United States, in the great majority of asylum cases a 
single immigration judge’s determination of the credibility of a claimant essentially determines 
the outcome once and for all.  As indicated above, determining a witness’s credibility is a very 
difficult task.  The law, particularly the Real ID Act, provides detailed guidance but assumes 
perfection in whoever makes the factual determinations of these difficult cases.  Just Law 
International, commenting on the provision of Real ID Act regarding judicial review said:  
Section 101 presumes absolute perfection on the part of the Immigration 
Judge: perfection in temperament, in wisdom, in clarity of insight, and in 
understanding of human nature.  Only perfect human beings could ever wield 
such a complete and unreviewable power of life and death over their fellow 
human beings without risking grave error.  Yet real-life experience is full of 
evidence that few, if any, such God-like persons have ever served as Immigration 
Judges. TPF287FPT 
 
The greatest difficulty arises when an applicant attempts to embellish his or her real story 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
TP
285
PT Id.   
TP
286
PT Kagan, supra note 263, at 386.  In fact, failure to remember one’s birthday or, for that matter, the birthdays of 
parents or siblings could clearly be grounds for denial in some immigration courts.   
TP
287
PT Just Law International, P.C., Critical Analysis of Section 101 of The Real ID Act of 2005 ii (Mar. 15, 2005), 
http://HTwww.jubileecampaign.org/home/jubilee/FINAL-RIDA.pdfTH (last visited Oct. 23, 2005) [hereinafter P.C.]. 
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and unwittingly imports inconsistency into that story.  Even if the true story is strong enough to 
warrant recognition, once any inconsistency is detected in the statement, adjudicators would be 
inclined to deny the case.  That is because the inconsistent statement not only damages the 
credibility of the applicant as a witness but also creates a sense that the applicant is an 
untrustworthy person who does not deserve the kind exercise of discretion.  Theoretically, 
honesty is not an element of refugee status; however, in practice, dishonesty is almost always 
fatal. 
Professor Hathaway argues that indeed “an individual can be untruthful and still be a 
Convention refugee.” TPF288FPT  He provides an interesting example: an adjudicator obtains sufficient 
documentary evidence that proves the identity of the claimant and the situations surrounding his 
persecution that meet all the requirements of the Convention.  In this case, the adjudicator is left 
without any alternative but to grant the case even if the claimant provides false testimony or, for 
that matter, fails to testify at all. TPF289FPT 
Along the same lines, Just Law International stated: “real-life experience is full of 
deserving applicants who have, at some point in their lives, stretched the truth, failed to speak 
with accuracy, failed to prevent misquotation, or relied upon false documentation for some 
purpose . . . everyone has friends or relatives who see things a little differently than they do.” TPF290FPTP P 
 It then concluded that any one of these real life situations could result in a death sentence for a 
                                                             
TP
288
PT James C. Hathaway, Understanding Refugee Protection as Human Rights Protection, paper presented at EU 
Presidency Seminar entitled, ‘International Protection Within One Single Asylum Procedure,’ organized by the 
Swedish Migration Board, the EU Commission and the U.S. Department of State, in Norrkoping, Apr. 23-24, 2001.  
Reproduced in the Report from the Seminar published by the Migration Board, cited in Brian Gorlick, Common 




PT Id.  
TP
290
PT Just Law International, P.C., supra note 288, at iii. 
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genuine refugee.TPF291FPTP P Other refugee advocates suggest that refusing to believe the stories of 
refugees is a method of accepting refugee protection in principle and denying it in practice.TPF292FPTP P  
   Presently, too much emphasis is placed on “consistency” and “credibility” in asylum 
adjudications around the world.  That might be the best that could be done under the 
circumstances; however, as this section shows, there are some serious shortcomings in these life 
and death decisions.TPF293FPT  The following section recommends some possible alternative solutions 
that may alleviate the consequences of possible erroneous decisions.       
 
V. ALTERNATIVES 
Asylum adjudications everywhere face the very serious adjudicative challenges discussed 
in Sections III and IV above.  As these sections have demonstrated, the regime of refugee 
protection instituted by the Refugee Convention is incapable of preventing a significant number 
of erroneous decisions.  Given the dramatic consequences of such decisions, it is indeed essential 
                                                             
TP
291
PT Id.  
TP
292
PT See David Matas, Credibility of Refugee Claimants, 21 IMMIGR. L. REP. 2D 134 (1994), cited in Kagan, supra 
note 263, at 368 n.4.  
TP
293
PT Asylum proceedings involve negative presumptions and biases, especially if a refugee comes from a nation that 
can be termed as economically underdeveloped.  It is commonly presumed that the refugee’s migration is a 
movement for economic benefits or personal convenience.  If for example, a refugee comes to the U.S. and alleges 
that his government will slay him should he return because he was a chairman of an opposition group, the judge or 
the immigration officer might tend to assume that, had this person been a chairman, he would have supporting 
documents.  If he produces documents, the judge might doubt how the person managed to collect all the documents 
while he was facing death or any kind of severe punishment. A very good example is a case cited by Professor 
Margulies, who wrote:  An immigration judge made an adverse credibility finding about a client who had been part 
of a band of politically active youths in a Haitian town (before the September, 1991 coup against Jean Bertard 
Aristid). The basis for the adverse credibility finding was that the young man “before fleeing his village, had taken 
the time to say goodbye to his mother.  The judge was incredulous.  How could someone in fear of his life devote 
precious time to say goodbye to loved ones?”  See Peter Margulies, Difference and Distrust in Asylum Law: Haitian 
and Holocaust Refugee Narratives, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 135, 137 (1993).  In denying a claim in another 
interesting case, an INS official stated: “The claimant said his father was murdered.  He had a newspaper article 
showing a picture of someone he said was his father and two other men in Iran being lynched.  But I don’t know if 
it’s his father.  He’s also got an affidavit from a friend who was present describing the executions.  But the friend 
could be lying.”  Davalene Cooper, Promised Land or Land of Broken Promise? Political Asylum in the United 
States, 76 KY. L.J. 923, 931 n.75 (1988) (quoting Arthur C Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An 
Unfulfilled Promise, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 243, 253 (1984)). 
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that there be an alternative to the outright execution of all of the decisions while clearly knowing 
that some of the refugees might be genuine but failed to prove it under the existing system.  This 
Section offers possible alternatives to the finality and imperfect execution of refugee status 
decisions with a view to alleviating some of the serious consequences.      
A. Domestic Alternatives  
Today, asylum seekers everywhere need not only prove that they have a well-founded 
fear of being persecuted but also must overcome negative presumptions, including the 
presumption that they are not economic migrants or terrorists.  It is fair to say that asylum-
seekers are presumed undeserving until they present their cases consistently, plausibly, and 
credibly to the satisfaction of the adjudicator.  The previous sections have demonstrated the 
difficulties that asylum seekers face in making their cases.  Because of such difficulties, it is 
often said that refugee status determination proceedings unwittingly favor those who are 
educated, well-traveled and multilingual.TPF294FPTP P Most of those who fail to articulate their cases are 
removed to places where they maybe subjected to severe treatment.    
The Congressional Commission for International Religious Freedom said that bona fide 
asylum-seekers who navigate the adversarial expedited removal process without the assistance of 
legal counsel are particularly vulnerable to being incorrectly removed.TPF295FPT  The statistics more 
than confirm this conclusion: from 2000 to 2004, 25 percent of represented asylums-seekers 
subjected to expedited removal were granted relief but only 2 percent of unrepresented asylum-
seekers under the same circumstances were granted relief.TPF296FPTP P In concrete terms, tens of 
                                                             
TP
294
PT See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 263, at 386. 
TP
295
PT See U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Report on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal, vol. 




PT See Report on Asylum Seekers vol. I, supra note 274, at 34, 56. 
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thousands of foreign persons are expeditiously removed from the US to their countries every 
year.TPF297FPTP  P 
Having conducted the most systematic and comprehensive study on a sub-set of asylum-
seekers, those in expedited removal procedures, the Congressional Commission essentially 
concluded that the existing system is not capable of preventing the erroneous removal of genuine 
refugees to places where they may face persecution.TPF298FPTP P No systematic study has ever been 
conducted to gather information regarding the situations of persons who had been removed to 
places where they claimed they would be subject to persecution.  Undoubtedly, under the 
existing system of asylum adjudication, genuine refugees are included among those who are sent 
back and face persecution.   
Given the undeniably significant error rate of asylum adjudications, the least that could 
be done is to treat rejected asylum-seekers no less favorably than ordinary undocumented 
immigrants.  For immigration enforcement purposes, asylum-seekers, even those who are not in 
detention, are easy targets for removal because their identities and address are very well 
documented.TPF299FPT  They are more likely to be removed than the average undocumented immigrant 
                                                             
TP
297
PT For example, in 2001, 69,055 foreign persons were expeditiously removed; in 2003, 43,336 were removed.  See 
id. at 32. 
TP
298
PT See id. at 50-76.  This study was the first of its kind.  It dealt with issues in great depth and presented its findings 
in clear terms.  The Commission’s final conclusion reads: “This study has provided temporary transparency to 
expedited removal – a process which is opaque not only to the outside world, but even within the Department of 
Homeland Security.  As a result of this transparency, serious – but not insurmountable – problems with expedited 
removal have been identified.”  See id. at 76.  No similar studies have been conducted with respect to affirmative 
asylum proceedings.  It is believed that some of the most serious problems noted in the expedited removal 
proceedings, particularly the proceedings before immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals, would 
be more or less similar.   
TP
299
PT Immigration enforcement in general varies significantly from state to state.  For example,  the Congressional 
Commission for International Religious Freedom reported that although some INS districts release almost all of 
detained asylum seekers from custody while their claims are being adjudicated, other districts release almost none of 
them.  The report indicated a remarkable disparity with this regard.  While the Harlingen, Texas district released 
97.6% of detained asylum-seekers from custody, the New Orleans district released only 0.5% of the detained 
asylum-seekers.  Every other district falls somewhere in between.  See Report on Asylum Seekers vol. 1, supra note 
273, at 33. 
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just because they attempted to use legally available avenues. 
To minimize the dramatic consequences of sending refugees back into the hands of those 
who may kill or torture them, extending temporary protected status to those who fail to meet the 
strict requirements of the law but present claims that are not clearly fraudulent would be 
consistent with the humanitarian objective of the Refugee Convention.  The main objective of 
this temporary status would be to impose a moratorium on removal of unsuccessful asylum-
seekers until such time that the benefits of the impending immigration reform is sufficiently 
defined.TPF300FPTP P For example, the benefits anticipated under the McCain-Kennedy “Secure America 
and Orderly Immigration Act” or even President Bush’s proposed “Fair and Secure Immigration 
Reform Act” could be extended to cover refugees under temporary protected status.TPF301FPTP P  
                                                             
TP
300
PT In July 2001, at an INS naturalization ceremony, President Bush stated: “Immigration is not a problem to be solved, 
[but] a sign of a confident and successful nation . . . [n]ew arrivals should be greeted not with suspicion and resentment, 
but with openness and courtesy.”  President George W. Bush, remarks at the INS Naturalization Ceremony (July 10, 
2001) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/07/20010710-1.html), quoted in Michele R. 
Pistone & Philip G. Schrag, The New Asylum Rule: Improved But Still Unfair, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 5 (2001). 
TP
301
PT The McCain-Kennedy bill would amend INA§ 101(a)(15)(H) to add a new visa category for workers who wish to 
come to the U.S. temporarily.  The proposed category is called “H-5A.”  The benefit would extend to family 
members of the visa holder.  See American Immigration Lawyers Association, The Secure America and Orderly 
Immigration Act, Section-by-Section Analysis, at 5 § 301 (2005), HThttp://www.shusterman.com/pdf/mccain605.pdfTH 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2006).  The visa would be granted for a period of three years with a possibility of renewal.  Id. 
at § 302.  Beneficiaries also would be eligible for adjustment after four years of employment.  Id. at 7 § 306.  The 
other proposed provision would add a new INA § 250A for a new visa category called “H-5B” for the benefit of the 
already existing undocumented immigration population.  See id. at 12 § 701.  The proposed bill would entitle such 
persons to live and work in the U.S. for a period of six years.  Id. at 13.  Such persons may apply for adjustment 
provided they meet the following criteria: (1) meet employment requirement; (2) pay application fees and additional 
$1,000 penalty; (3) are admissible under immigration laws; (4) fulfill medical examination requirements; (5) show 
proof of payment of taxes; (6) demonstrate knowledge of English and American civics; (7) pass security and 
criminal background checks; and (8) register for selective service, if otherwise applicable.  See id. at 13.  This 
proposed bill does not exclude persons already in removal proceedings or those ordered removed from the benefits 
of H-5B visa category including the possibility of adjustment.  The bill proposes to accept 400,000 workers from 
other countries for the first year under H-5A category with a possibility of a 20% increase the next year.  See id. at 6. 
 President Bush’s guest worker program, on the other hand, anticipates a three-year renewable permit and 
encourages return after some years of service.  It proposes a mechanism of addressing financial and other needs of 
foreign workers when returning to their countries.  The guest worker program does not completely rule out the 
possibility of applying for citizenship through existing mechanisms.  It is, however, unclear what added advantages 
such authorizations would grant the beneficiaries as far as their path to citizenship is concerned.  See Press Release, 
White House - Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Fair and Secure Immigration Reform (January 7, 2004), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040107-1.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2005).  In fact, Senator 
McCain argues that there is no significant difference between his proposal and President Bush’s proposal.  Speaking 
to reports on the subject, he said: “If you think it’s different in some key aspects, you’ll have to point them out to 
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Evidently, some sort of immigration overhaul is inevitable.  Predicting the exact political 
compromise that could be achieved might be difficult; however, it is easy to anticipate that some 
variations of President Bush’s and McCain-Kennedy proposals likely will be enacted into law.  
There is no legal or socio-economic justification to treat persons who were considered to have 
failed to present a refugee status claim consistently and credibly less favorably than any other 
undocumented economic immigrant.  What is fair and consistent with the underlying 
humanitarian objective of refugee protection is that persons who unsuccessfully sought asylum 
are not made ineligible to immigration benefits that the general illegal immigrant population is 
likely to be entitled to.  Humanity demands that removal of refugees who were unable to present 
their cases with the required level of consistency but who may be genuine refugees be halted.  
This is particularly important with respect to refugees who come from places with very well 
known authoritarian and abusive systems.   
B. International Alternative  
   Human rights norms represent the best examples of norms of international law that 
require internal application. TPF302FPT  The obligations states undertake in international human rights 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
me.”  See Stephen Dinan, McCain-Kennedy bill opens citizenship path, WASH. TIMES, May 13, 2005, 
http://www.washtimes.com/national/20050512-111803-6952r.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2005). 
TP
302
PT The views and practices of states always have been different regarding the application of international law in the 
municipal arena.  The relation between international law and domestic law has been a subject of great controversy 
over the ages.  One proposition is that international law and domestic law are completely different regimes, and thus 
some sort of transformation is required in order for international law to be applied in the domestic arena.  The other 
argument is that both legal systems are just parts of one uniform legal system in which international law is superior 
in the hierarchy, and thus domestic laws should always confirm to international law.  HENKIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 
153.  Although some states require enabling acts for the application of international law in their domestic courts, 
others give effect to international treaties without any such enactments.  In most countries, their constitutions provide 
for the status of international agreements in their domestic systems.  See id. at 153-193.  While some international 
treaties need not be applied internally, others are without value unless applied internally.  Id. at 153.  Since the very 
nature of human rights norms demands the domestic application of the standards, most  human rights conventions so 
authorize.  For example, Article 2 of  the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides: 
“where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measurers, each State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the 
present Covenant, to adopt such  laws or other measurers as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized 
in the present Covenant.” ICCPR, art. 2, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, available at 
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laws are exclusively domestic by nature. TPF303FPT  Except when a treaty expressly provides as to how it 
should be implemented, states determine the specific mechanisms to carry out their 
obligations.TPF304FPT  Some treaties make a specific reference regarding what should be done at the 
domestic level, however others leave implementation open to the discretion of states.TPF305FPT  
Whenever a treaty provides for what states should do in the domestic sphere, such provisions 
become the obligation.  When a treaty is silent about the application of its provisions within the 
member states, the inevitable result is inconsistent application.   
 The Refugee Convention is an international agreement that does not express the 
obligation of the parties to apply the provisions in the domestic arena in any particular fashion.  
However, some signatories have undertaken international obligations to accord the benefits 
enshrined in the Convention to persons considered refugees.   
  Generally, international law governs the relationships between and among states, not the 
relations between states and individuals. TPF306FPT  Even though individuals can be beneficiaries of 
rights and obligations created by international law, they cannot be repositories of rights and 
obligations as such. TPF307FPT  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
HThttp://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htmTH (last visited Mar. 2006).  “Article 2 creates duties on the part of the 
state parties with respect to the domestic application and guaranteeing of all rights in the covenant.  It gives 
expression to the principle that the implementation of human rights under international law is primarily a domestic 
matter; international implementation is essentially limited to supervision of domestic measurers.” MANFRED NOWAK, 
U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, CCPR COMMENTARY 27 (1993).  A similar provision is also 
contained in The Genocide Convention, supra note 204, at art. 5. 
TP
303
PT See NOWAK, supra note 302, at 27. 
TP
304






PT S. PRAKASH SINHA, ASYLUM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 62 (1971).  “The proponents of object theory maintain 
that the individual has no rights and duties of his state under international law, and that he, as its object derives 
benefits from it and suffers its burdens only as an incidence of the rights and duties of his state under this law." Id. 
(footnotes omitted).  "Certain writers suggest that the individual is occasionally even a subject of international law, 
as when states enforce this law up on him as part of their municipal law.”  Id.  For a detailed discussion of the 
position of individuals in international law, see HENKIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 374-94.  See also, MANUEL R. 
GARCIA-MORA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ASYLUM AS A HUMAN RIGHT 7-23 (1956).  
TP
307
PT See PRAKASH SINHA, supra note 306, at 68.  However, there have been instances where individuals were held 
responsible for acts they have committed as individuals.  The best example for this is the trial of the Nazi German 
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Generally, there are limited individual complaint mechanisms in place in the international 
arena.  Examples include the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, which grants individuals a chance to submit complaints to the Human Rights 
Committee.TPF308FPT  Also, the European Convention on Human Rights provides a mechanism 
whereby individuals may petition against any violation by any contracting state to the European 
Commission of Human Rights.TPF309FPT  Lastly, the Committee Against Torture also has a mechanism 
for individual complaints.TPF310FPTP P International agreements, including human rights conventions, 
focus on states’ obligations towards one another except in the above cited and related 
instances.TPF311FPT   
As discussed above, with the growth of international human rights law, states’ actions 
toward persons within their jurisdictions are increasingly becoming a matter of international 
concern.  The international instruments cited above do not make a distinction between citizens 
and non-citizens; they simply include everyone who falls within state jurisdiction. TPF312FPT  Thus it 
could be argued that all aliens, including refugees, are beneficiaries of these provisions as long 
as they remain in the territories of the contracting states.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
officials before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg between 1945 and 1946 in accordance with the 
London Charter.  The London Charter was concluded on August 8, 1945, among the nations of United Kingdom, 
France, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic.  See supra note 204. 
TP
308
PT Article 2 of the Optional Protocol, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 302, reads: “Subject to the provisions of article 1, 
individuals who claim that any of their rights enumerated in the Covenant have been violated and who have 
exhausted all available domestic remedies may submit a written communication to the Committee for consideration.”  
TP
309
PT See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221, at art. 25 [hereinafter The European Human Rights Convention].  
TP
310
PT The Committee Against Torture is a body of independent experts who monitor the observance of obligations 
undertaken by state parties to the Convention Against Torture.  TConvention Against Torture, supra note 4. T   Under 
the Convention Against Torture, all state parties are required to submit period reports.  The Committee may consider 
interstate complaints.  In addition to these traditional methods of monitoring, the Committee is given authority to 
look into individual complaints of torture or cruel and degrading treatments.  See Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Monitoring the prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, HThttp://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/TH (last visited Nov. 11, 2005). 
TP
311
PT See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 595. 
TP
312
PT See, e.g., The European Human Rights Convention, supra note 309, at art. 1. 
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It is, however, the earliest development of international law that a foreign state’s 
treatment of an alien under its jurisdiction is the concern of the alien’s country of origin. TPF313FPT  An 
injury to a citizen of a certain state has always been considered an injury to that state. TPF314FPT  
Professor Henkin writes: “Long ago, we know, a government which offended a citizen of Rome 
offended Rome and if an American is abused elsewhere today, the United States is offended.” TPF315FPT 
 He adds that it was a widely accepted principle that injustice to a stateless person was not 
considered a violation of international law because no state was offended to invoke a remedy for 
such injury. TPF316FPT   
By the same token, because a refugee is by definition a person who is outside of his 
country due to a fear of persecution either perpetrated or tolerated by the government of his 
home country, naturally that government would not come to his rescue if the refugee is abused 
elsewhere.  To the contrary, under normal refugee circumstances, an injustice done to the 
refugee would even please the refugee’s home government.  And of course, in the normal course 
of dealings, it is rather the admission and good treatment of refugees that is considered a 
manifestation of ill-will towards the country of origin and is usually considered as an unfriendly 
act that may, at times, jeopardize the relations between states. 
 For example, writing for the majority in INS v. Juan Anibal Aguirre-Aguirre,TPF317FPT Justice 
Kennedy noted:  
                                                             
TP
313









PT Id.  “State responsibility for injury to aliens, for example, is not seen as creating rights for the alien under 
international law, he or she benefits because the law sees an offense to the individual as an offense against the state 
whose nationality the individual bears, remedies for violation of these norms are accorded only to the state.”  Id. at 
595.  “If the alien has suffered an injury as a result of a violation of a substantive rule of international law 
attributable to a foreign state of which he or she is a national may assert, on the state-to-state level, a claim against 
the offending state that is based on the injury to the alien.”  Id. at 677.  
TP
317
PT 526 U.S. 415 (1999). 
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A decision by the Attorney General to deem certain violent offenses committed in 
another country as political in nature, and to allow the perpetrators to remain in 
the United States, may affect our relations with that country or its neighbors. The 
judiciary is not well positioned to shoulder primary responsibility for assessing 
the likelihood and importance of such diplomatic repercussions.” TPF318FPT  The UNHCR 
also says that on a practical level, governments regard the grant of asylum as a 
political statement and can be an irritant to inter-state relations. TPF319FPT   
 
Indeed, diplomatic repercussions are at the forefront of the system of refugee protection 
worldwide.   
This being the political reality of refugee protection, it is fair to conclude that an injury to 
a refugee is a pleasure to the state of his nationality.  Precisely because of this systematic 
peculiarity, over the last half-century that the Convention has been in operation, not a single case 
was referred to the International Court of Justice for adjudication.TPF320FPT  
A very important aspect of the Convention is the recognition of the UNHCR as a 
supervisory body.  To this effect, Article 35(1) of the Convention states:             
The contracting states undertake to cooperate with the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency of the United Nations which 
may succeed it, in the exercise of its functions, and shall in particular facilitate its 
duty of supervising the application of the provisions of this Convention TPF321FPT  
 
As far as refugees are concerned, the UNHCR is thus the only possible substitute for the 
traditional diplomatic protection that sates provide to their citizens in foreign lands.  Evidently, 
                                                             
TP
318
PT Id. at 425.  The acts in question included rioting, burning buses, smashing windows, attacking police cars, etc., to 
protest government policies.  See id. at 418.  
TP
319
PT Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Sub-Committee of the Whole on International 
Protection, Implementation of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees – Some 
Basic Questions, UN Doc. EC/1992/SCP/CRP.10, 15 June 1992, at 9, cited in WALTER KALIN, SUPERVISING THE 
1951 CONVENTION ON THE STATUS OF REFUGEES: ARTICLE 35 AND BEYOND 13 n.72 (2001), 




PT See KALIN, supra note 319, at 30.  Theoretically, other state parties to the Convention may regard themselves as 
victims of a violation by another state party, particularly when violation relates to norms of erga omnes nature; 
however, they have absolutely no incentive to actively pursue remedies on behalf of refugees who are not their 
nationals.  See id. at 19.  Thus no case has ever been brought by any state for the benefit of any refugee anywhere, 
and the UNHCR Executive Committee said that it is unlikely that such a case may be brought in the future.  See id. 
at 30.    
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however, the UNHCR’s existing obligations, coupled with a fear of endangering relations with 
host governments, has had a significant impact on the UNHCR’s ability to supervise the due 
implementation of the Convention.TPF322FPTP P As a result, the need to design a better mechanism for 
meaningful supervision and enforcement of the Refugee Convention is admittedly long 
overdue.TPF323FPTP P 
The Executive Committee of the UNHCR, on occasion, has outlined various options to 
boost monitoring of implementation and also has suggested a new mechanism for third party 
monitoring of the Convention.TPF324FPT  It outlined several requirements that this mechanism must 
meet.  The requirements include: independence and expertise, objectivity and transparency, 
inclusiveness, operationality, and complementarity.TPF325FPT  Employing these criteria, it 
recommended the establishment of a Sub-Committee on Review and Monitoring to carry out 
refugee protection reviews to identify obstacles to the implementation of the Convention and 
achieve a more effective implementation of these principles.TPF326FPTP P  
The Executive Committee’s proposals are limited to mechanisms that the committee 
members deemed feasible, but these are not necessarily the best mechanisms to achieve 
compliance.  By the committee’s own statements, the best mechanism of ensuring compliance is 
the introduction of an individual complaint procedure to a newly created treaty body.TPF327FPTP P The 
Commission identified three major problems with creating a new body: (1) adherence would not 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
TP
321
PT The Refugee Convention, supra note 2, at art.35(1). 
TP
322
PT See KALIN, supra note 319, at 13. 
TP
323
PT See id. at 39.   
TP
324
PT See id. at 28-35.  
TP
325
PT See id. at 29.  
TP
326
PT See id. at 33.  The Sub-Committee would operate by way of a team of experts who would review identified 
situations and issue reports which would be transmitted to the States as a public document.  In addition, it is 
recommended that the Sub-Committee on Review and Monitoring would initiate a discussion for the establishment 
of a judicial body that may issue advisory opinions on issues of refugee law.  See id.  
TP
327
PT See id. at 27.  “The possibility for individuals to petition a judicial or quasi-judicial body at the international level 
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be universal because states following more restrictive lines would not be willing to ratify an 
additional Protocol establishing this mechanism; (2) rejected asylum-seekers in Europe and 
America would use this mechanism to prolong their deportation, and it immediately would be 
overwhelmed; and (3) it would weaken the UNHCR’s existing possibilities of taking up 
protection matters with governments.TPF328FPT   
    Despite these possible shortcomings, however, an individual complaint system is the 
only truly effective mechanism that would ensure compliance to a significant degree.  However, 
the feasibility of the individual complaint procedure is extremely doubtful for yet another reason. 
 State parties are unlikely to subject the decisions of their courts or administrative agencies to a 
review by an international body.  Consequently, the best option to prevent the refoulment of 
genuine refugees seems to be an independent review by the UNHCR (whether through a sub-
Committee or any other mechanism) of final removal orders with two major objectives: (1) to 
determine if the person ordered deported is a person of concern to UNHCR under its mandate; 
and (2) to look for another state party that might be willing to take him or her before the removal 
order is executed from the first country.  
This proposal is feasible because it does not create a new treaty body or a new mandate.  
It utilizes, more effectively, UNHCR’s existing legal mandate and strengthens its infrastructure 
in developed countries without compromising its humanitarian assistance work in the developing 
world.  This proposal also would utilize the UNHCR’s expertise and strong partnership with 
human rights bodies and regional intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies for the 
effective delivery of its international protection service.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
regarding alleged violations of their rights as guaranteed by an international convention or treaty is often regarded as 
the most effective form of monitoring.”  See id.  
TP
328
PT See id. at 32-33. 
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Implementing this proposal could be difficult, notably because it would impose a 
financial burden and because of the possibility of large caseloads.  The financial constraints 
could be overcome through new fundraising initiatives for this particular purpose; also, fees 
could be charged to the potential beneficiaries who might be willing and able to share some of 
the cost associated with their application and relocation process.  The caseload could be 
minimized by defining strict criteria for review of final removal orders.  The review could focus 
on issues affecting large numbers of refugees as well as on determinations of facts and country 
condition assessments contrary to the UNHCR’s general findings and understandings.   
This review process would minimize the number of refugees who may be erroneously 
sent back to their countries of origin.  Using these procedures, the UNHCR may implement the 
principle of burden sharing by facilitating orderly relocation of persons of concern to other 
countries who might be willing to accept the refugees and give them a second chance.TPF329FPT  At 
                                                             
TP
329
PT It must be noted that this is entirely different from the resettlement programs from refugee camps in developing 
countries to willing developed countries.  This attempts to minimize the possibility of sending genuine refugees 
because of faulty administrative decisions in developed countries by giving such refugees a second chance to present 
their cases to UNHCR and then to authorities of a second state.  For example, a refugee who has been ordered to be 
removed from the U.S. by the BIA may petition to the UNHCR.  If UNHCR determines that that person falls under 
its mandate or in some way regards him or her as a person of concern, it may endeavor to facilitate his or her transfer 
to other nations that might be willing to take him or her.  The reality is that asylum-seekers rejected in the U.S. 
sometimes find refuge in Canada and vice-versa.  This was particularly so prior to the Canada-U.S. Safe Third 
Country Agreement, signed on December 5, 2002 as part of the Smart Border Action Plan.  Canada-U.S. Safe Third 
Country Agreement, Dec. 5, 2002, available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/policy/safe-third.html (last visited Mar. 
2006) [hereinafter Safe Third Country Agreement].  Although this agreement significantly decreased the number of 
claimants, particularly in Canada, it does not completely preclude the reconsideration of adjudicated cases by the 
authorities of the other country when deemed appropriate.  See id. at art. 6.  UNHCR’s involvement in such endeavor 
would ensure an orderly and transparent transfer of refugees from places where they are not recognized for different 
reasons to places where they may be welcome.  For example, Canada maintains a moratorium on removal to 
designated countries—Afghanistan, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, and Rwanda.  
Canadian Council for Refugees, Safe Third Country Agreement: Impact on Refugee Claimants, Frequently Asked 
Questions (Oct. 18, 2005), http://www.web.net/~ccr/s3cFAQ.html (last visited Mar. 2006).  In situations where an 
unsuccessful asylum-seeker in the U.S. might be at a serious risk of being sent back to these countries, UNHCR 
might facilitate the asylum-seeker’s transfer to Canada.  This possibility is not completely ruled out under the Safe 
Third Country Agreement.  Article 9 of the agreement provides: “Both Parties shall, upon request, endeavor to assist 
the other in the resettlement of persons determined to require protection in appropriate circumstances.”  Safe Third 
Country Agreement, supra, at art. 9.  In fact, the parties have agreed to invite the UNHCR in their review process.  
See id. at art. 8.  As such, UNHCR could play a significant role.  It is very well known that Canada has a 
significantly higher rate of approval than the U.S. for certain groups.  For example, in the year 2001, about 60% of 
 
 
6 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 180 (2006). 
times, even elaborate systems of criminal proceedings, aided with twelve jurors, convict 
innocent people.  As indicated throughout this article, the possibility of erroneous decisions in 
asylum proceedings where mostly one person makes factual findings using elusive standards 
with little or no review is undoubtedly significant.  Hence, asylum-seekers rejected by a one 
person system deserve a second chance.   
CONCLUSION 
 
The Refugee Convention selects a narrowly defined category of persons for protection.  It 
employs strict criteria which inter alia exclude the great majority of refugees in mass-exodus 
situations.  The core requirements of the Refugee Convention that are designed to select the 
category of persons as deserving of international protection are themselves extraordinarily 
elusive.  The burden and standards of proof are replete with serious flaws both in their 
formulation and in their application.  Asylum adjudicators attempt to determine claims for 
refugee status using such elusive standards and extremely limited evidence.  The only evidence 
is often exclusively the statement of the claimant. Most genuine claims tend to be consistent and 
credible.  However, some genuine refugees inevitably encounter serious difficulties in presenting 
their cases with the requisite level of consistency and credibility.  With the growth of asylum 
jurisprudence, adjudications have become increasingly adversarial.  In some cases, the 
humanitarian object and purpose of the Refugee Convention are completely overlooked. 
 The approval rates of immigration judges vary significantly and without plausible 
explanation.  A singular person’s findings of fact usually stand unchallenged because of the great 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
the persons who claimed refugee status in Canada arrived in Canada from the U.S.; in 2002 the number was 72%.  
See Maria McClintock, US-Canda Safe Third Country Agreement, CALGARY SUN, May 7, 2002, cited in Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of Asylum Seekers to Third Countries: The Meaning of 
Effective Protection, 15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 567, 582 (2003).  In actual numbers that is approximately 15,000 
applicants.  The reverse was just 200.  See id.  One of the most important reasons is the difference in the approval 
rating of the two countries.  This signifies that there are refugees who may be considered as such in one country but 
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deference accorded to the factual findings of immigration judges.  New asylum policies changed 
approval rates significantly within a very limited period of time.  Refugees with legal 
representation enjoy a significantly higher rate of approval.  By the mere fact of being refugees, 
they are entitled to no diplomatic protection by any state.  Their injuries invariably remain 
without redress.  Most litigate their cases with their liberties restrained under an imminent threat 
of deportation.   
 In view of all these factors, it cannot be concluded with a significant degree of 
confidence that asylum adjudication is a system of jurisprudence without substantial flaws.  
Undoubtedly, genuine refugees are included among those whose claims are rejected everyday.  
For example, in Pasha v. Gonzales, Judge Richard Posner unequivocally concluded that the 
performance of federal agencies dealing with asylum cases “is too often inadequate” and 
“depressing.” TPF330FPT  The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit similarly concluded that there was 
a “disturbing pattern” of mishandling of asylum cases by the immigration court that sent 
refugees back to countries where they could face persecution.TPF331FPT   
 Humanitarianism demands that a solution be sought to accommodate the needs of such 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
not in the other.  
TP
330
PT See Pasha v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 530, 531 (7th Cir. 2006) (“At the risk of sounding like a broken record, we 
reiterate our oft-expressed concern with the adjudication of asylum claims by the Immigration Court and the Board 
of Immigration Appeals and with the defense of the BIA’s asylum decisions in this court by the Justice Department’s 
Office of Immigration Litigation.”).  Twelve days after this decision, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales wrote a 
letter to all immigration judges acknowledging the problem that Judge Posner noted.  The Attorney General said: “I 
have watched with concern the reports of immigration judges who fail to treat aliens appearing before them with 
appropriate respect and consideration and who fail to produce the quality of work I expect from employees of the 
Department of Justice.”  Richard Acello, Immigration Court Review Ordered, Attorney General Questions Quality 
of Work, Lack of Respect, ABA JOURNAL e-REPORT, Jan. 20, 2006, 
HThttp://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/j20immig.htmlTH (last visited Mar. 2006).  According to the United States 
Courts’ Administrative Office, the number of appeals filed challenging the findings of the BIA rose up a staggering 
515% since the restructuring of the BIA.  Id.  For example, the number of such appeals in the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit rose from a mere 170 to 2,632 from 2001 to 2004, an increase of 1,448%.  Id.  According to the 
New York Times, immigration cases involving asylum accounted for about 17% of all federal cases in the year 2004. 
 Such cases accounted for about 3% in the year 2001.  The report indicates that in New York and California, nearly 
40% of all federal cases are immigration related.  See Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges’ Handling of Asylum 
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at A1.    
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refugees.  Unfortunately, it is very difficult to identify the genuine refugees among rejected 
asylum-seekers because these refugees are exactly the persons that the system failed to identify 
in the first place.   However, if it means that some unworthy individuals would be included in 
any possible accommodations, such might be a price that humanity needs to pay.  
This article outlined two possible alternative accommodations: a temporary solution in 
the context of the United States immigration situation and an international alternative.  In the 
U.S., it is suggested under Section V(A) above that removal of those rejected asylum-seekers 
who have presented claims that are not clearly fraudulent be temporarily halted until such time 
that the exact specifications of the likely immigration overhaul are determined.  These categories 
of persons could possibly be entitled to some temporary or substitute immigration status to 
which the general undocumented immigrant population also might be entitled.  These refugees 
are unlikely to be treated less favorably than the general undocumented population mainly 
because a contrary treatment would effectively penalize immigrants who attempted to use the 
legal avenues. 
The international alternative, discussed in Section V(B) above, suggests that the UNHCR 
should facilitate the transfer of persons whom it determines as persons of concern, under its 
Statute or otherwise, to places where they may be recognized as refugees prior to the execution 
of their removal order.  This suggestion calls for the UNHCR to take an increased monitoring 
role.  It is quite evident that numerous instances exist where refugees who fled similar or even 
identical set of circumstances are recognized in one system but rejected in another.  The UNHCR 
must attempt to help refugees explore this narrow window of hope.  In reality, refugees explore 
such options anyway, albeit in a gravely dangerous and disorderly manner.  In such 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
TP
331
PT Liptak, supra note 330. 
 
 
6 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 183 (2006). 
circumstances, neither the host states nor the refugees win. A second chance for refugees would, 
in all earnest, serve the interest of both humanity and order.  
 
